<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889</id><updated>2011-07-07T20:37:01.365-07:00</updated><category term='forecast'/><title type='text'>The Stock Valuer</title><subtitle type='html'>Selected writing on value investing</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>52</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-7314877868749538789</id><published>2010-07-24T05:08:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-07-24T05:12:31.620-07:00</updated><title type='text'>StockValuer migrated to Unfair Value</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;I've moved to new web location &lt;a href="http://www.unfairvalue.com/"&gt;http://www.unfairvalue.com/&lt;/a&gt; . The Stock Valuer will be soon removed from the cyberspace. Please visit the new site for new articles.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;Regards&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;Kamlesh&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-7314877868749538789?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/7314877868749538789/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=7314877868749538789' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/7314877868749538789'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/7314877868749538789'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2010/07/stockvaluer-migrated-to-unfair-value.html' title='StockValuer migrated to Unfair Value'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-2959889073244546548</id><published>2009-05-16T01:57:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-05-16T03:24:05.070-07:00</updated><title type='text'>test</title><content type='html'>&lt;embed id="VideoPlayback" src="http://video.google.com/googleplayer.swf?docid=3897274042353134646&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=true" style="width:400px;height:326px" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"&gt; &lt;/embed&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;embed id="VideoPlayback" src="http://video.google.com/googleplayer.swf?docid=-6231308980849895261&amp;hl=en&amp;fs=true" style="width:400px;height:326px" allowFullScreen="true" allowScriptAccess="always" type="application/x-shockwave-flash"&gt; &lt;/embed&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;test&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;OBJECT ID=RVOCX CLASSID="clsid:CFCDAA03-8BE4-11cf-B84B-0020AFBBCCFA" WIDTH=400 HEIGHT=326&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="SRC" VALUE="http://today.caltech.edu/theater/30623_bb.ram"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="CONTROLS" VALUE="ImageWindow"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="CONSOLE" VALUE="video"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="AUTOSTART" VALUE="false"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;EMBED SRC="http://today.caltech.edu/theater/30623_bb.ram" WIDTH=400 HEIGHT=326 NOJAVA=true CONTROLS=ImageWindow CONSOLE=videoAUTOSTART=false&gt;&lt;/EMBED&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/OBJECT&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;OBJECT ID=RVOCX CLASSID="clsid:CFCDAA03-8BE4-11cf-B84B-0020AFBBCCFA" WIDTH=400 HEIGHT=36&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAMR='src' value="http://today.caltech.edu/theater/30623_bb.ram"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME='autostart' value="false"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="CONTROLS" VALUE="ControlPanel"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;PARAM NAME="CONSOLE" VALUE="video"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;EMBED SRC="http://today.caltech.edu/theater/30623_bb.ram" WIDTH=400 HEIGHT=36 NOJAVA=true CONTROLS=ControlPanel CONSOLE=video&gt;&lt;/EMBED&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/OBJECT&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-2959889073244546548?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/2959889073244546548/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=2959889073244546548' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/2959889073244546548'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/2959889073244546548'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2009/05/test.html' title='test'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-868592664551566565</id><published>2008-06-04T13:48:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-12-27T00:30:42.086-08:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='forecast'/><title type='text'>Oil Prices: Suprise again</title><content type='html'>The forever rising oil prices have continued to throw up surprises in the face of analysts who talk as if oil tells them every morning where it is headed. The surprises are not only limited to the course of the price movement, but its speed, its impact on economy and its inflationary expectations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When teh crude started moving from 20$ per barrel people predicted it will go to 50$ and the economy will grind to halt.It will have wide reaching consequences in the industries consuming oil. They even talked about the third world war.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oil did move to 50 but the much feared impacts didn't happen. People started talking about crude at 80. Some bolder ones said 100. OPil followed suit and economies of the world did largely bore the oil shock well.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now the analysts changed their predictions. While they continued talking about their next target price (essentially 2X)  of 150$. Oil gave them hope by touching 135$. The audacious 200$ oil folks were found smiling.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, the impact of rising oil prices began to show its impact. It happened very silently. It happened in direct impact on inflation and secondary impacts through rising prices of few food items which started feeding oil guzzling cars rather than hungry mouths.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As we talk about the 200$ oil, I'm getting signals which suggest that oil may surprise people once more. It may correct to as low as 70-80$ per barrel in coming 12 months. However by this time the damage would have been done and the economies of he world would have shaved 2-3% in their GDP growth rates.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In find the fears about oil running out or rising from this levels completely unfounded. They ignore the basic laws of demand and supply. The day oil starts hurting growth, it will lose the steam which was driving it so far. The seemingly unstoppable engine of crude oil prices is about to stall in its upward journey and will hurtle backwards under the effect of its own gravity.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Good times will be back soon.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-868592664551566565?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/868592664551566565/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=868592664551566565' title='3 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/868592664551566565'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/868592664551566565'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2008/06/oil-prices-suprise-again.html' title='Oil Prices: Suprise again'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>3</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-5635101436258751996</id><published>2007-10-02T05:32:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2007-10-02T06:16:33.339-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Black someday</title><content type='html'>We have them so often. Once in a while in different countries the headlines scream "Black Monday". The days when parties rudely come to an end and markets tank. And we are left with a hangover and a nonsensical talk of healthy corrections.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Don't get me wrong . I'm not reading out from pages of financial history. I'm writing about a not so far future, (before the end of year) when we are going to see a 1000 point drop in Sensex almost without a reason. The reasons will be invented later but if look carefully the reasons are being present now. The towering 1.321 trillion dollar market cap of Indian equity market is crumbling under its own weight. The leaning tower of PISA is much more stable. It has withstood centuries. You can years before it falls but the markets?? You better look at figures&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The sensex 23.42 times its earning, 5.57 times its book value. The boards of these companies know that these earnings are not sustainable. That is why the dividends yield is at 1.02%. This means only 24% of the earnings is being distributed as dividends.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The E in the P/E ratio is inflated due to&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Clever(but legal) accounting which marks down the interest costs. The indian companies have taken more than 25billion dollars of ECBs/FCCBs. The currency fluctuation gains due to declining rupee are  against interest cost. These one time gains are propping up  the earnings.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;High prices of all commodities are benefiting primary producers like mines, oil exploration etc. The secondary producers are able to pass up these costs down.  For example lets say few years ago I bought X tons of steel at Y crs   and sold steel pipes at 1. 2Y crs. Today the same X tons of steel costs me 3Y crs and I sell it at 3.5 Y crs. Even though my business hasn't moved an inch my sales have grown almost 3 times and profit 2.5 times.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Apart from these special factors there is a genuine growth in economy which is being helped by benign  economic atmosphere characterized by low inflation, not so high interest rates, demographic factors and increased productivity.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;The P/E rations are inflated because&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;The markets are confusing the growth in revenues/profits to growth in output. The output of the companies is growing at much slower pace and once the price rise stops, the growth in revenues and profits would be much lower&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;The markets are not adjusting for special factors contributing to the earnings&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;The markets are extrapolating the growth far to ahead in future when the current global environment doesn't seem to be so conducive for growth.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;So we are in a situation where the companies are showing better than average earnings and markets are giving these earning better than average discounting in the hope that these earnings are not only sustainable but indicative of even brighter future.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When this optimism comes to an end(I wish I knew when!)  a sudden realization  would struck the investors that like fools they have been holding risky securities which are paying 4.25% earning yield (out of which you get 1.02% as dividend) when your conservative grandfather is earning a cool 9.5% in FDs riskfree&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On the eve of that Black &lt;some&gt;day, the high-flyer portfolio manager will come home and say  "You were right dad"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/some&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-5635101436258751996?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/5635101436258751996/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=5635101436258751996' title='2 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/5635101436258751996'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/5635101436258751996'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2007/10/black-someday.html' title='Black someday'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>2</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-116085865711442670</id><published>2006-10-14T13:42:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-10-14T13:44:30.693-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Logical fallacies: representativeness bias</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Decision making is science in its own right. I have seen very few people who are good decision makers in one field and very poor in others. Many people fail to realize this. If their investing decisions go often wrong then they would probably infer that&lt;br /&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span&gt;1.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;They don’t have the correct information&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span&gt;2.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;They have the correct information but They don’t have required skills to derive correct inferences from that information.&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;Their comments on their failures give away their beliefs.. “If only I had the insider information I would have made money”…. “If I had done MBA in finance I would have been able to analyze the stock and made money”&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;More often than not, the reason of their failure can be attributed to failure in making rational decisions. It has nothing to do with finance. It has nothing to do with the amount of information they get. In coming few weeks I would explain the fallacies in reasoning which cause erroneous decisions. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;Suppose I tell you that in last one year, every Monday morning I wrote a BUY or SELL in my diary for Sensex. In past one year 69.2% of my weekly BUY decisions were correct. Would you be interested in buying a weekly newsletter from me?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Interesting question. Think about it before you jump to a conclusion. As I’ve already hinted I’m questioning your capability to take rational decisions.&lt;br /&gt;..&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;..&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Before you send me the mail confirming you decision, I would like you to know the secret behind my correct predictions. I tossed the coin every Monday to decide whether the market will rise or fall. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Number of weeks I gave a BUY signal&lt;span&gt;                                       &lt;/span&gt;: 26&lt;br /&gt;Number of weeks the Sensex closed higher than previous week: 36&lt;br /&gt;Number of weeks I gave a BUY signal and Sensex rose&lt;span&gt;            &lt;/span&gt;: 18&lt;br /&gt;% of weeks where my BUY signal was correct&lt;span&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;= 18/26&lt;span&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;=&gt; 69.2%&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Now you can infer that if you succeeded in 69.2% of all your BUY decisions this year, you haven’t done better than a Buffett’s orangutan in coin flipping contest. Similarly if an analyst brags about his “in the bull’s eye” recommendations he hasn’t done great job either. In Behavioral finance this is known as &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representativeness_heuristic"&gt;representativeness bias&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Regards&lt;br /&gt;Kamlesh&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-116085865711442670?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/116085865711442670/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=116085865711442670' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/116085865711442670'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/116085865711442670'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/10/logical-fallacies-representativeness.html' title='Logical fallacies: representativeness bias'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-115971636287400947</id><published>2006-10-01T08:25:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-10-01T13:04:17.666-07:00</updated><title type='text'>The two envelopes problem</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Many times the investors switch stocks with fallacious reasoning created by a flawed argument. I would show an example of one simple puzzle which leads into complex error of judgment.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;Let's say you are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of which contains a positive sum of money. One envelope contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep whatever amount it contains. You pick one envelope at random but before you open it you're offered the possibility to take the other envelope instead.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;Now, suppose you reason as follows:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ol start="1" type="1"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;I denote by &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt; the      amount in my selected envelope&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;The probability that &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;      is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it's the larger also 1/2&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;The other envelope may contain either 2&lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt; or &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;/2&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;If &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt; is the      smaller amount the other envelope contains 2&lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;If &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt; is the larger      amount the other envelope contains &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;/2&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;Thus, the other envelope contains 2&lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt; with probability 1/2 and &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;/2 with probability 1/2&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;So the &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_value" title="Expected value"&gt;expected value&lt;/a&gt; of the money in the other      envelope is&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;V = ½ * 2A + ½ * A/2 = 5/4 *A&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ol start="8" type="1"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;This is greater than &lt;span style=""&gt;A&lt;/span&gt;,      so I gain on average by swapping&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;                                                                                                &lt;/span&gt;Source- &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-envelope_paradox"&gt;wikipedia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/i&gt;Your intuition would most probably realize that there is something wrong but you may find it difficult to spot flaw in the reasoning given above. &lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;When you are calculating expected values using the equation in step 7, you are assuming that 50% of the time the other envelop would contain 2A and 50% of the time it would contain A/2. Its like saying that 50% of the time the envelops would be (A/2, A) and rest 50% of the time these would be (A, 2A). This is incorrect because the problem statement doesn’t say that. I can play the same game by giving (100$,200$) envelops repeatedly.&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;What you should see is that for any given set of envelops (A,2A), you would pick A 50% of the time and 2A, 50% of the time. If you are holding the 2A then you have conditional probability of 100% to lose by a swap. When your are holding A then you have conditional probability of 100% to gain by a swap. It is important to note that both his gain and loss are same as the smaller sum and the expected gain by swapping is zero.&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;V = 1/2 * 100% * A + 1/2 * 100% * (-A) = 0&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;When you are offered a chance to swap, you haven’t gained any extra information about the contents of another envelop, hence the probability of choosing the higher value envelop remains same. I’m as good as with the chosen envelop as I’m by swapping.&lt;/p&gt;          &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;This situation can have real life equivalents with an additional twist. A transaction cost involved in swapping which makes swapping a losing proposition because the expected value is negative.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;Another variation of the problem where the following 2 arguments lead to conflicting conclusions:&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ol start="1" type="1"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Let the amount in the      envelope you chose be &lt;i&gt;A&lt;/i&gt;. Then by swapping, if you gain you gain &lt;i&gt;A&lt;/i&gt;      but if you lose you lose &lt;i&gt;A&lt;/i&gt;/2. So the amount you might gain is      strictly greater than the amount you might lose.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Let the amounts in the      envelopes be &lt;i&gt;Y&lt;/i&gt; and 2&lt;i&gt;Y&lt;/i&gt;. Now by swapping, if you gain you gain      &lt;i&gt;Y&lt;/i&gt; but if you lose you also lose &lt;i&gt;Y&lt;/i&gt;. So the amount you might      gain is equal to the amount you might lose.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;Solution:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Argument 2 has already been explained above so let us focus on argument one. When I lose I’m holding a sum twice as large as the sum I’m holding when I gain by swapping. So the A/2 in losing swap transaction is equal to A in the gaining swap transaction because A in both are not same.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-115971636287400947?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/115971636287400947/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=115971636287400947' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115971636287400947'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115971636287400947'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/10/two-envelopes-problem.html' title='The two envelopes problem'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-115417862283222018</id><published>2006-07-29T05:59:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-29T06:10:22.950-07:00</updated><title type='text'>PEG Stands for Purely Esoteric Garbage</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;PEG is completely worthless piece of information in analysing a stock. Its The relation to price and earning is non linear. First look at the DCF equations would tell you that. You would have used DCF models. Just plot a graph on the DCF valuation and different values of expected growth. Notice the curvature of the graph. You will see that any approximation of this curve using a straight line plot will lead you to huge errors.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;tt&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;PEG comes handy when you have to convince yourself to buy a stock which has cought your fancy. The decision has been made but the rational mind requires justification. In comes PEG. At stock growing at 20% available at PEG of only 1. Utter bullshit!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PEG would give you wrong result even if your growth estimation was correct. If you are ready to tolerate bit of maths then here is why I'm saying this.&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Suppose PEG is a constant.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;P = P/E * E&lt;br /&gt;P/E &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;= PEG * growth&lt;br /&gt;P = PEG * growth * E&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Suppose you have 3 companies with EPS, of Rs. 1 per year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol start="1" type="A"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Available at price 100, expected to grow at 3%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Available at price 300, expected to grow at 9%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Available at price 900, expected to grow at 27%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;PEG of all these choices are same. Suppose you invest Rs. 9000 in each of these companies. Lets also assume that your prediction about growth was correct. Now see what happens in the 20th year from now.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol start="1" type="A"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Earning 157.8, accumulated profit &lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;2418.3&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Earning &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;154, &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;accumulated profit &lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;1534.8&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal"&gt;Earning &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;938, &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;accumulated profit &lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;4375&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;Earnings = EPS* no. of shares&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;In hindsight company C was obviously better choice than A but A was significantly better than B. Why did we get this bizarre result? This is because PEG is a variable. Its different for each combination of price and growth. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Mathematically PEG is a slope of the curve plotted between growth and P/E applicable for that growth. When you compare PEG of two different companies then you are assuming that linear relationship between growth and P/E and you would get wrong results here even when you correctly predict the growth.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Sourced from:&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/2169&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-115417862283222018?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/115417862283222018/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=115417862283222018' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115417862283222018'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115417862283222018'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/07/peg-stands-for-purely-esoteric-garbage.html' title='PEG Stands for Purely Esoteric Garbage'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-115417792639776518</id><published>2006-07-29T05:56:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-29T06:11:46.080-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Mad rush for high growth</title><content type='html'>&lt;ol style="margin-top: 0in;" start="1" type="1"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;If the      investing public in general, anticipates growth then the prices move up.      Many times this rise in prices negates any advantage that the investor      would get if the growth did materialize&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;If the      prices are high you are essentially paying for a future which has not yet      materialized. [compare this with paying for the assets which exist as of      now]&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;As the      business conditions are subject to change there is a risk involved in      paying for growth. Higher the expected growth, higher the risk. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;ol style="margin-top: 0in;" start="1" type="a"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;If       you are expecting 27% per annum growth for 20 years and the company grows       at 24.3% for 20 years, you have been amazingly accurate in your prediction.       Your forecast is just 2.7%(0.1G) off the mark. But the accumulated       profits in these 20 years would be 30% less than what you forecasted and       the profit in the terminal year would be 35% less than your forecast. If       you paid for this high growth you may end up loosing even after this       stellar clairvoyance.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;For       a 10% growth prediction the same 0.1G, i.e. 1% forecasting error would result       in only 12% and 17% hit to accumulated profits and terminal year profits.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Its      easy to overrate growth expectations. If a company has grown at a rate of      50% p.a. in last 5 years and future looks bright, can I expect the CAGR of      27% p.a. for next 20 years. Its very difficult. If the company grows at      CAGR of 27% for 20 years its profits would be 119 times current profits.      Given that the company had grown 50% p.a. in last 5 years, the profits 20      years later would be staggering 904 times the profits it had 5 years ago.      The question arises&lt;/li&gt;&lt;ol style="margin-top: 0in;" start="1" type="a"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Does       the company has management capacity and vision to achieve this? Scaling       up 904 times in 25 years is almost impossible(except for startups which       have low base).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Even       with 10% p.a. productivity enhancements, this would require 17.7 times resources.       It can be capital or human resource. Can the company raise so many       resources?&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;If       the future is indeed that bright many more competitors would join the       fray. The margins would go down due to law of diminishing returns. Can       you expect the revenues to grow more than 119 times? &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Suppose       the company has 10% market share of the industry. If the industry grows       at 15% in the same period the market share of this company would rise to       72.7%, almost a monopolistic level. What is the strength that makes you       assume that this company would become a monopoly in 20 years.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;The      more you look at these arguments the more you would realize the fallacy of      the growth assumptions. When you do this you become averse to paying high      for high growth. I would love to buy a growing company if I don’t have to      pay an extra dime for that growth. The profits of M&amp;amp;M, Sterlite,      Jindal have grown as fast as market favorites like Infosys, Wipro. But I      paid P/E of 2-5 compared to p/E of 25-40 commanded by Infosys, Wipro. When      the growth materialized I gained 20 to 30 times appreciation. If the      companies were to fail and go bankrupt I would have got out without      significant loss because the price paid was 50% less than the market value      of the assets. Such valuations look highly improbable now but the markets      have history of manic depressive syndromes. So its better to wait      patiently when markets are in manic phases.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Finally      what makes you think that the underdogs wont turn the tables. In 2002 SAIL      was deep in red. It reported loss of 1707 crs. You may have thought SAIL      would go bankrupt, but it bounced back to profitability. In FY05 the      profits were 6817 crs., in FY06 4013 crs. Needless to say stock price      jumped through the roof.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Growth      is good. We all want our companies to grow. But we want them to grow more      than the growth that’s already built into prices. Absolute growth number      is meaningless and its pursuit has been one of main blunders, the money      managers have made throughout the financial history[I’ll explain this some      other day]. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-115417792639776518?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/115417792639776518/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=115417792639776518' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115417792639776518'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115417792639776518'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/07/mad-rush-for-high-growth.html' title='Mad rush for high growth'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-115297750421414589</id><published>2006-07-15T08:31:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-15T08:31:44.540-07:00</updated><title type='text'>On Discounted Cash Flow Valuation</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;If we would have been able to reduce the stock valuation to a set of mathematical equations then equity investing wouldn’t have been fun. While I understand the utility of following a systematic approach to valuation, I give very little weightage(approx. 2.5%) to the results of my DCF models in my decision making process. The reason for that is simple. The process required so many assumptions that the probability of being right is very small. It is, however, important to do this exercise because it makes you aware of the risks you are taking and it can give you some clues about the upside.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I generally prefer doing sensitivity analysis on the results of these models. For example if valuation resulting from a set of assumptions is X then I would like to see how this changes if the variables change. For example what if the growth tapers off? What if the interest rates rise? This gives me some idea of the margin of safety I have, while making the investment decision.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Each long term investor must understand that at the bottom of it, he is a businessman. You may be owning smalls parts of many businesses but that doesn’t change the essential nature of the argument. When a businessman takes a decision, say to expand capacity, he would do rough calculation on the expected returns. He would analyze the output price levels which would be needed to make the breakeven. He would check the investments required, fixed costs, running costs to make an educated guess about profitability of the project.&lt;span style=""&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;He would do an analysis of competitive advantages and disadvantages. He would analyze the market to see if there is room for expanded capacity. If the plan looks fine on paper, he would check if he has resources, expertise and capital to execute the plan. Finally he would think about fall back plans, exit options in case the things don’t go as planned. &lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;To me it would look pretty odd to see a businessman basing his investment decision solely on the output of discounted cash flow valuation models. If this argument is correct then the utility of DCF model to for long term investors should not be overrated.&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;There is a difference in analyzing the expected returns from a mature business and analyzing the expected returns from a new project. The mature businesses tend to be more predictable but not predictable enough to e reduced to a set of mathematical equations.&lt;/p&gt;Regards&lt;br /&gt;Kamlesh&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/"&gt;La Warren Buffett&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-115297750421414589?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/115297750421414589/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=115297750421414589' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115297750421414589'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/115297750421414589'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/07/on-discounted-cash-flow-valuation.html' title='On Discounted Cash Flow Valuation'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114815732545211736</id><published>2006-05-20T13:34:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-20T13:35:25.643-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Butterfly Effect</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;"What happened? 13.2% down in 7 days. It's brutal. It didn't even give you time of adjust your expectations. And all for no obvious reasons. You tune into CNBC and the analysts talk about the correction that was long over due. Correction! all right..but why the **** you didn't tell me that it was incorrect."&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;I've seen it happening so many times that I've almost lost interest. But I want to answer the question that many people have asked me in past few days.Why did the markets fall?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Do you know about Butterfly Effect?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;No?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Ok…Do you know &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;butterfly's wings might create tiny changes in the atmosphere that ultimately cause a tornado to appear (or, for that matter, prevent a tornado from appearing)&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;No jokes. It a concept from &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory"&gt;Chaos Theory&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;The butterfly effect is a phrase that encapsulates the more technical notion of sensitive dependence on initial conditions in chaos theory. Small variations of the initial condition of a dynamical system may produce large variations in the long term behavior of the system.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;The concept becomes relevant in investing world because the valuation methods used to estimate value of a stock are ultra sensitive to the initial variable. On top of that we routinely indulge in oversimplification of valuation concepts so that they can be expressed in simple ratios. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;Lets talk about P/E. Most of you would know that the ratio is calculated by diving price by earnings. But which year's earning are talking about. You would often see reports stating that the stock is quoting just 8 times its FY08 EPS! Cheap..isn't it? &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span&gt;            &lt;/span&gt;Even if you calculate by taking the average earnings of last 3 years, as Graham suggested, how would you know if P/E&lt;span&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;15 is expensive or not? What's the benchmark?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The benchmark is provided by the risk free interest rate and the estimate of risk premium. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The valuation process is known as &lt;a href="http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/"&gt;Discounted cash flow&lt;/a&gt; method.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;But the problem with the model is that it takes estimates of highly volatile variables as inputs. There is no way of predicting the growth rate of next 10 years. Nor can you ascertain the trends in risk free interest rates or the right level of risk premium. At best we go by our guesstimates which are susceptible to changes in general mood. When everything looks positive people find 1% risk premium enough to invest in blue chip stocks. At the same time they overestimate the expected growth rate. To see the effect lets take an example.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;Suppose you were given a task for estimating these variables for 10 year period and here are the actual results&lt;/p&gt;&lt;table class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse;" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="554"&gt; &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr style="height: 11.15pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="126"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="117"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Growth&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="153"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Interest rate&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="158"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Risk premium&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 11.15pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="126"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Estimate&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="117"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;22%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="153"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;8%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="158"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;5%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 11.15pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="126"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Actual&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="117"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;18%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="153"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;9.00%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 11.15pt; text-align: left;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="158"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;6.00%&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The interest rate rise a bit. Growth is a little lower and investors little more cautious. By all means you have performed very well. But the result.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;You valuation model will show that the value of stock must be 75% of your initial estimate. Its shocking. and it's analogous to Butterfly Effect in chaos theory. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;This minor change in initial estimates can cause the estimates of correct valuations to change. The impact is almost always coordinated. That means the changes in these variables impact the valuations in the same direction. For instance when the interest rates rise the estimates of growth are revised downward and risk premium shoots up. The combined effect can be disastrous.&lt;/p&gt;To answer the question..Why did the markets fall?   A butterfly flapped its wings, which, through complex chain of intermediate events, caused instability in the world financial system and well......Rest is history&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cheers&lt;br /&gt;Kamlesh&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Note: text in &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;italics&lt;/span&gt; sourced from wikipedia&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114815732545211736?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114815732545211736/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114815732545211736' title='2 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114815732545211736'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114815732545211736'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/butterfly-effect.html' title='Butterfly Effect'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>2</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114676385708725191</id><published>2006-05-04T10:28:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-04T10:30:57.703-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Sensex and Sensibility</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;In 2004 end I has posted a report&lt;span style=""&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/files/Reports/Report%20on%20BSE%20Sensex%20Revisions.doc"&gt;Exclusive report on Sensex underperformance&lt;/a&gt; on the poor performance of Sensex and reason behind that. The summary of the report was that BSE has done rather too many changes in the index and has gone more ‘with the momentum‘ which has made it a speculative portfolio which can never beat a long term portfolio.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Though it is too early to say, but the Sensex has become more stable as a portfolio. The number of changes per year have come down and have become sensible. In last 2 years they made only 3 changes with Maruti, NTPC and TCS taking place of MTNL, HPCL and Zee tele.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;The following stats would give you the idea about this.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;1996 - 15 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;1998 - 4 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2000 - 4 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2001 - 1 change&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2002 - 4 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2003 - 5 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2004 - 1 changes&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;2005 - 2 changes &lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The results are showing up. I can bet that they wouldn’t have done any better by making more changes to the indices in last 2 years. In fact the number of changes in popular global indices is very low. Dow had 7 changes between 1999-2006. S&amp;P 500 typically has 15-20 changes per year. If an index has to become worthy of tracking by the index funds then it should be like a long term portfolio.&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style=""&gt;Its very difficult to beat a well diversified index with minimal changes. Princeton University Professor Burton Malkiel found that the S&amp;P 500 beat 70% of all equity managers retained by pension plans over the 1975–1994 20-year period. Another study by Robert Kirby, former Chairman of Capital Guardian, indicated that out of 115 U.S. equity mutual funds that were in business for 30 years or more, only 41 (36%) beat the S&amp;amp;P 500 by some margin, and only 23 of the funds (20%) beat the index by 1% per year or more. &lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/files/Investing/Ten%20ways%20to%20beat%20an%20index"&gt;Report&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;      &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;But why should it be so difficult. For example if you want to beat S&amp;P then all you have to do is to find JUST 1 stock which you think would perform worse than performance of S&amp;amp;P next year. Then you should divide the money in rest 499 stocks as per the index weightage. If you turn out to be correct then you will beat S&amp;P 500 and you would be doing better than 70% well paid finance managers.&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;It looks good as a theory but in reality the only god damned stock which you removed turns out to be the stock which outperforms the index. &lt;span style=""&gt; &lt;/span&gt;(remember m&amp;m’s expulsion from Sensex in 2002)&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;That’s why its such a fun to race against indices. I envy the pleasure Buffett gets while beating S&amp;amp;P 500 year after year. I hated Sensex because it could be beaten hands down with value investing approach. If it continues on the path of stability (buy and hold) and it would be fun to compete against it. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114676385708725191?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114676385708725191/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114676385708725191' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114676385708725191'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114676385708725191'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/sensex-and-sensibility.html' title='Sensex and Sensibility'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646987475256219</id><published>2006-05-01T00:50:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:55:27.013-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Comparing your performance</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;Comparing performace of 2 investment portfolios is not a matter of comparing 2 numbers.  In this message I would describe what factors you should consider before comparing performance of your portfolio with anybody else's.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;1. Performance of a portfolio on paper(on one web) is not comparable to the performance of your invested money. Many members have said that they were following the portfolio on paper. Paper portfolios are waste of time and create illusion of learning. This is because the two important psychological factors, fear and greed are absent when you operate without money. &lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;2. Performance can be compared on equal timeframes. If you have beaten Sensex this year, it not a reason to be happy. Similarly if you failed to beat it(like me) you don't need to worried.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;3. Performances on short time frames(less than 3 years) are not worth comparing.&lt;br /&gt;[By my estimates, next 3 years be a disappointing for all those who are investing today by selecting top performing mutual funds. ]&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;4. Performances on dissimilar investing styles are not comparable. You can not compare value investing based portfolios with growth oriented portfolios. Similarly comparisons in mid cap vs. large caps, &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;focused vs. diversified portfolios are equally meaningless. Each of these have different risk associated with them which doesn't show up in `Top 10' lists.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;5. Performance which don't take into account the short term capital gain tax and brokerages are a delusion. Similarly for mutual fund investors what matters is the returns after subtracting loads/expenses. This factor alone makes indices difficult benchmark to beat because the indices are long term portfolios and have no fee(or minimal fee charged by ETF)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;While ending this experiment I'm not proud because it gave 53% p.a returns. I'm proud because I got those returns by following my investment philosophy. This gives me confidence that I can reasonably hope to continue getting above average returns in future.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;In investing the determining factor your maturity aren't your returns. Its your investment philosophy. Returns are byproducts of how you think.  For new investors I think its OK to loose money on the way towards figuring out your investment philosophy. For mature investors its OK to under perform the markets in short/medium terms as long as you are following your investment philosophy(see Buffett's relatively poor performance in 1997-2000 period). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Hence I should extend my congratulations to all the members who didn't get good returns while following their well thought investment philosophy. We are all running a life time marathon. If you are right then the time will prove you right. If you are throwing darts then the laws of probability will catch up with you, sooner or later.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Posted: Apr 23, 2006&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1968"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1968&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646987475256219?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646987475256219/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646987475256219' title='4 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646987475256219'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646987475256219'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/comparing-your-performance.html' title='Comparing your performance'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>4</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646963561410504</id><published>2006-05-01T00:45:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T01:04:04.466-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Holding companies: A real life example of complexities involved</title><content type='html'>I would like to share a 'live' case from my personal portfolio on the subject of investment in holding companies.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;On August 6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2004 I sold Sterlite and bought MALCO to take advantage to disparity in the prices.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/message/809"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/809&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;When Sterlite came out with rights issue, I was concerned that MALCO would increase its debt to unsustainable levels(it later renoucned its right and pruned its debt). A month after the swap I reversed this transaction. Though we made 14% gain in this, the swap was a mistake because the LWB Special portfolio was not supposed to take risky bets for small arbitrage gains.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/message/891"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/891&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;However in my personal portfolio I continued back and forth swap between Sterlite and MALCO depending upon which looked expensive relative to other. Over next year I completely swapped Sterlite with MALCO. MALCO became my single biggest investment and it was the only stock where my personal portfolio differed from LWB Special.&lt;o&gt; Sterlite continued its rise and MALCO couldn't keep pace. Consequently I was underperforming compared to market.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Considering the fact that MALCO's market capitalization was less than the value of stake it owned in Sterlite, I had every reason to remain patient but as I've explained elsewhere holding companies test the limits of your patience.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The following table shows the movement of the stocks from starting value of 100. Its clear that although in long term the value of holdings is taken into account, it can take years. One might get frustrated and sell(or may be die in the meantime!). When the revaluation takes place its sudden and abrupt. MALCO gained 76% in 5 months in 2004. After this it became dormant while Sterlite continued to rise. On April 7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2006 Sterlite had risen by 353% whereas MALCO was up by only&lt;font&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;127%. At this point MALCO's market capitalization was 625 crs. whereas the value of 4.61% stake it held in Sterlite was 1057 crs.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;table class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse;" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="376"&gt; &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr style="height: 10.55pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="134"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;Date&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;MALCO&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;Sterlite&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 10.55pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="134"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;28-Jul-04&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;100&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;100&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 10.55pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="134"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;21-Dec-04&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;176&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;128&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 10.55pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="134"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;7-Apr-06&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;227&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;453&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr style="height: 10.55pt;"&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="134"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;19-Apr-06&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;372&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;td style="height: 10.55pt;" nowrap="nowrap" valign="bottom" width="121"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:10;"  &gt;516&lt;o&gt;&lt;/o&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt; &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/files/Reports/sterlite-malco.jpg"&gt;View chart of relative price movements&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;I was obviously frustrated with this situation and broke my prudent limits on maximum exposure to single stock. To my pleasant surprise the price of MALCO rose 64% in last 10 days. Even today it was locked at upper circuit breaker at Rs.458. (consequently last 10 days turned out to be most profitable 10 days of my investing career)&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Coming back to original question. Was I right about swapping Sterlite with MALCO? May be not. Sterlite rose from 416% since July 04 whereas MALCO rose only 272%.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;I know what you are thinking! If I had swapped from Sterlite to MALCO on July,2004, back to Sterlite on Dec, 04, back to MALCO again on 7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 06 then I would have made 920% gain. Such perfect timing works only in theory.&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The reasons which compelled me to buy MALCO remained valid throughout the period from July 04 to date. So in such case if I did a swap it was logically correct decision. In spite of a correct decision I haven't made anything more than what I would have made by just sticking to Sterlite, the way we did in LWB Special. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;To summarize, exploiting the inefficient valuation of holding companies remains a perennial attraction for many value investors. Many of us underestimate the complexities and timeline involved in correction of these inefficiencies. The purpose of holding company is to hold the stock..forever. Isn't it irrational to expect that `unlocking of value' in such cases?&lt;o&gt; &lt;/o&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;On the other hand it is easy to get impatient in such cases and miss those 10 days when the inefficiencies are corrected. As a rule most value investors would be better of staying away from complicated situations like this. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;This rule may not apply if you are willing to hold INDEFINITELY. In those cases its always advisable to swap as soon as you see a sizeable advantage. If you try to time your entries and exits you may end up getting returns lower than either of the stocks involved.&lt;/p&gt;Regards&lt;br /&gt;Kamlesh&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646963561410504?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646963561410504/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646963561410504' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646963561410504'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646963561410504'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/holding-companies-real-life-example-of.html' title='Holding companies: A real life example of complexities involved'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646953286739095</id><published>2006-05-01T00:44:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:45:32.933-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Do we learn from mistakes?</title><content type='html'>Not necessarily.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Our assumption that we learn from mistakes is one of many such fallacies that arise from confusing logical deduction with logical induction. Other such fallacies include "taking high risk for high returns".&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Allow me to delve little deep here. Its happens to be my favorite subject. Logical deduction implies a guarantee that if the premise if true, the conclusion would be true.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Lets take a classic example. "If it rains the ground would be wet". If you know that it has rained today then you can deduce that the ground would be wet.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However when you see a wet ground in the morning and say that "it must have rained tonight", you are using inductive logic. In logical induction, a premise provides some degree of support for the conclusion but not a guarantee.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nothing new..Right??  Just look around and you would find that this is THE MOST COMMON mistake we make regularly and we never learn from it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A learning process requires assimilation of knowledge and putting it to practical use. When we venture out in open, with `less than perfect' knowledge, we make mistakes. It's a part of learning process. But its not the mistake, per se, which teaches you. It requires a rigorous amount of discipline and analysis to be able to figure out what went wrong. An Iranian saying goes like this "man is a donkey which falls twice in the same ditch" . Leaving aside the question "are women any better",  I tend to agree with this saying. More often than not, you would find a pattern of mistakes getting repeated in your life. That's what you call your weaknesses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Coming back to original question.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We commit mistakes in the learning process but committing mistakes doesn't teach us anything. It's the analysis and corrective measure that enables us to learn. Unless this feedback loop is established you can continue making the same mistakes forever.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My personal experience suggests that the costliest mistakes of my investing life didn't teach me anything worthwhile. Its like having a crush on someone as a teenager. You don't really learn anything. You aren't mature enough to be able to analyze otherwise you wouldn't have been in that situation in the first place. In the initial few years, I lost lot of money in trading but I didn't learn anything from that. You can argue that I learnt the lesson that you can't make money in trading. I use the same argument to justify that foolishness but the fact of the matter is, I was sowing seeds in an arid land. It was waste of time and money.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There is no correlation in the number of your own mistakes and learning. I've leant a lot by reading and analyzing mistakes made by other people. At this stage I don't need to commit a mistake to be able to learn.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So my advise to new investors is that unless you are sure that you have, what it takes to learn from mistakes, don't commit them. Stay away from direct equity investments. You don't have to be jack of all trades. You got to be good at what you doing for living.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This doesn't mean that you can't be master of all trades. You can(my mind is saying I am!). Its difficult, time consuming, complex and confusing task but not impossible.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Mar 21, 2006&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1903"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1903&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646953286739095?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646953286739095/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646953286739095' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646953286739095'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646953286739095'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/do-we-learn-from-mistakes.html' title='Do we learn from mistakes?'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646945238323786</id><published>2006-05-01T00:42:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:44:12.463-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Asset Allocation</title><content type='html'>In this message I would like to give my views on the question of "What assetclass should one look into and does the fund size matter?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You should invest in the areas which you know of. There are thousands&lt;br /&gt;of areas where you can invest but if you don't know anything about&lt;br /&gt;that field, stay away! For instance I don't invest in real estate even&lt;br /&gt;though I know that it has given decent returns in past. I simply don't&lt;br /&gt;know enough about it to take decisions. I know that many people would&lt;br /&gt;say that they can invest with help of some financial advisors but it&lt;br /&gt;takes a certain minimum knowledge to be able to decide whether the&lt;br /&gt;financial advisor can be trusted to take investment decision on your&lt;br /&gt;behalf.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Having limited your asset classes in this manner you can evaluate the&lt;br /&gt;risk/return profile of that asset class with your own risk appetite&lt;br /&gt;and return expectations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The asset allocation would be different if you had different amount of&lt;br /&gt;investment money. An investment transaction has two aspects, the&lt;br /&gt;investor and the investment. When you invest 10% of your total&lt;br /&gt;networth(including cash, fixed income instruments, equity, real&lt;br /&gt;estate, precious metals &amp; other assets) then you can afford to take&lt;br /&gt;higher risk because even a 100% equity portfolio mean that your&lt;br /&gt;exposure to equities is just 10% of your networth.&lt;br /&gt;Another aspect that comes into play is the effect of volatility of&lt;br /&gt;the investment. If you have networth of 20 lacs and you invest 50% of&lt;br /&gt;it in equities, then be ready to face few days in year when your&lt;br /&gt;networth may be down by 2% or Rs 20,000. If you panic in such case and&lt;br /&gt;loose you sleep then I would say that the asset allocation itself was&lt;br /&gt;wrong.&lt;br /&gt;Finally the amount of investment matters in asset allocation because&lt;br /&gt;of the time characteristics of assets. Liquid investments can be&lt;br /&gt;encashed at your will but in other cases you can end up losing if you&lt;br /&gt;liquidate your investment before maturity date. This is true not only&lt;br /&gt;in debt but also in equity. If you plan for a long term equity&lt;br /&gt;investment then you should know that in short term the prices may go&lt;br /&gt;down. If you are forced to sell due to your needs then you have paid a&lt;br /&gt;penalty. So you got to create a rough demand/supply schedule of your&lt;br /&gt;funds. How much money you might need in less then a year, in 1-3 years&lt;br /&gt;and how much of money you can safely park for future. In economic&lt;br /&gt;terms this is called a demand schedule for funds. Similarly if you are&lt;br /&gt;earning more than your immediate needs then you will be accumulating&lt;br /&gt;funds which create your supply schedule for funds. Your aim should be&lt;br /&gt;to avoid mismatch in requirement for your funds and availability of&lt;br /&gt;liquid assets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Having done all this homework yourself or with help of your financial&lt;br /&gt;advisors, you are ready to ask specific questions about specific asset&lt;br /&gt;class. There is no direct asnwsers for asset allocation problem.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:Mar 7, 2006&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1866"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1866&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646945238323786?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646945238323786/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646945238323786' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646945238323786'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646945238323786'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/asset-allocation.html' title='Asset Allocation'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646918249402108</id><published>2006-05-01T00:35:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:39:42.596-07:00</updated><title type='text'>My Investment philosphy</title><content type='html'>I don't have any academic background in finance and I don't miss it.&lt;br /&gt;I've followed a unique way to train myself in this subject. The basic&lt;br /&gt;tenets of my approach are.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Hear it straight from the Horse's Mouth: I don't like text books. I&lt;br /&gt;would rather read Kenyes and Adam Smith, than reading a text book on&lt;br /&gt;economics. Similarly in investing I've learnt more from the investors&lt;br /&gt;like Graham, Ficher and Buffett. Here too I preferred reading all the&lt;br /&gt;60 odd letters to shareholders rather than a cook book on Buffett.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Practice it: No matter how much you read theory you never learn&lt;br /&gt;without applying the theory into practice. If you lack conviction to&lt;br /&gt;put your money where your mouth is, then you haven't really learnt. At&lt;br /&gt;various times 70 to 140% of my net worth has been in stocks and it has&lt;br /&gt;given me a lot of impetus to learn, to avoid mistake. I can not afford&lt;br /&gt;to speculate. I reserve my gambling instincts to card games.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. When someone points to the moon, don't catch the finger: You got to&lt;br /&gt;imbibe the essence of teachings and develop your own strategy. Time&lt;br /&gt;and again people ask me that you buy commodity stocks and still say&lt;br /&gt;that you follow Buffett's philosophy. I'm operating in a different&lt;br /&gt;environment, with different fund size and with different level of&lt;br /&gt;skill. I have much better chances of getting high returns following&lt;br /&gt;myself than following Buffett. Just the same way as Buffett developed&lt;br /&gt;his own strategy after learning from Graham, I have to develop my own&lt;br /&gt;optimized for my operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I said that "Circle of competence is a fuzzy thing" because everyone&lt;br /&gt;misjudges his competence level. You would remember the famous&lt;br /&gt;experiment where people in the group were asked to judge their driving&lt;br /&gt;skills on a scale of 1 to 10 relative to the group.&lt;br /&gt;The average of their scores was 7.5 !&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I'm no different. In 1994, when I was 18, I used to think that I know&lt;br /&gt;a lot about stocks. Five years later I had lost a fortune, trading in&lt;br /&gt;stocks and I still believed that I knew about investing. All that&lt;br /&gt;changed after I read Buffett. Things have become much simpler and&lt;br /&gt;pleasant fro that point on.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The differences between my approach 4 years ago and today have to do&lt;br /&gt;with maturing of my strategies, more realistic assessment of risks&lt;br /&gt;involved and increased confidence. Now I know that I can afford to sit&lt;br /&gt;back for a while and still generate above average returns. I don't&lt;br /&gt;have to outperform Sensex in each of its every mad rush.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Over the years I have become more circumspect in giving advise. The&lt;br /&gt;quality of investment is just of facet of investment transaction. The&lt;br /&gt;investor is the second facets. Suppose I give a long term `buy' advise&lt;br /&gt;and you think that it will give you 100% in 2 month. It falls by 30%&lt;br /&gt;that month and you sell it, then my advise is meaningless. I've come&lt;br /&gt;to know that even sound advise can harm people. That's why you would&lt;br /&gt;never see messages from me, with glossy titles like "million dollar&lt;br /&gt;advise" even if I believe it is.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In spite of being in IT I find IT businesses very difficult to&lt;br /&gt;predict. I like commodities because the equations are very simple&lt;br /&gt;there. The next thing I like are branded businesses where revenues are&lt;br /&gt;predictable.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To summerize, investing is not about making great and accurate bets.&lt;br /&gt;Its about being 100% sure in avoiding big mistakes. The amount of&lt;br /&gt;effort it takes to be 100% sure automatically ensures that you end up&lt;br /&gt;buying stakes into great businesses and returns usually follow.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Feb 5, 2006&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1781&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646918249402108?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646918249402108/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646918249402108' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646918249402108'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646918249402108'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/my-investment-philosphy.html' title='My Investment philosphy'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646889109993855</id><published>2006-05-01T00:33:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:34:51.150-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Dividend yield</title><content type='html'>Low dividend yield can have different meanings for different people.&lt;br /&gt;To me dividend is a very useful return provided by the company for&lt;br /&gt;today's income needs while retaining sufficient cash to keep growth&lt;br /&gt;engine humming. The future earning is like promise of a party later&lt;br /&gt;in lieu of a starvation diet today. The investor who lives on&lt;br /&gt;investment income needs dividend and has every right to consider 1.5%&lt;br /&gt;dividend yield as low(compared to returns from fixed income). The&lt;br /&gt;investor who is skeptical about the promise of party at a later&lt;br /&gt;date(like me) would not like the starvation diet.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the matter of dividends I belong to old schools(of Graham). I don't&lt;br /&gt;like companies which pay very low dividend. I can't imagine such a&lt;br /&gt;bright future which requires the management to keep every penny of the&lt;br /&gt;cash the business is generating. The capacity to pay dividends lends&lt;br /&gt;credibility to the assumption that the management expects the current&lt;br /&gt;earning to grow from here.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My past experience in this field shows that dividend yield can be an&lt;br /&gt;important parameter in judging the sustainability of earnings.&lt;br /&gt;1. Most good companies have maintained their dividend at the same&lt;br /&gt;levels even in the time of crisis(M&amp;M 2000-01). This may be an&lt;br /&gt;indicator that the management thinks that the lower earnings of that&lt;br /&gt;years are temporary downturns.&lt;br /&gt;2. Most good companies have increased the dividends as their profits&lt;br /&gt;have grown, thereby maintaining the dividend payout ratio.&lt;br /&gt;3. Many dishonest companies can be nailed down during analysis because&lt;br /&gt;they show continuous rise in earnings but no change in dividend. Such&lt;br /&gt;earnings are either fake or ephemeral.&lt;br /&gt;4. The good companies which pay very little dividends(Software&lt;br /&gt;Infy/TCS) haven't really achieved anything much by retaining the cash.&lt;br /&gt;I would have been happier if these companies paid more liberal dividends.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I'm not convinced by the argument that you can get the same return due&lt;br /&gt;to rise in the price of stock. In such cases I've to (1) make an&lt;br /&gt;assumtion that such price rise is permanent (2) I've to liquidate a&lt;br /&gt;part of my holding to satisfy my income needs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I've reservations on both counts. Capital gain is not comparable to&lt;br /&gt;dividend till the gain is booked. If I've to reduce my stake in a&lt;br /&gt;company just to get enough cash for my current needs, then it doesn't&lt;br /&gt;solve my purpose.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 28, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1691"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1691&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646889109993855?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646889109993855/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646889109993855' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646889109993855'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646889109993855'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/dividend-yield.html' title='Dividend yield'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646878859941603</id><published>2006-05-01T00:31:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:33:08.700-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Deferred Revenue Expenditure</title><content type='html'>In last few years many Indian companies had adjusted their accumulated&lt;br /&gt;deferred revenue expenditure against the security premium&lt;br /&gt;account(SPA). Such write offs have helped the companies to escape the&lt;br /&gt;reduction in profits due to amortization. In my analysis I try to&lt;br /&gt;account for such things but I felt a need to have a broader discussion&lt;br /&gt;on this subject. So here is the complete story. Do post your views and&lt;br /&gt;comments.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Around 2001-03 the companies started the restructuring binge. The auto&lt;br /&gt;companies were leading the pack. Here are some new items.&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blonnet.com/iw/2003/02/09/stories/2003020900270700.htm"&gt;http://www.blonnet.com/iw/2003/02/09/stories/2003020900270700.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; Tata Engineering set off Rs 1,180 crore against the share premium&lt;br /&gt;account in 2001-02, Ashok Leyland is in the process of writing off Rs&lt;br /&gt;160 crore the same way while Tata Steel had planned to set off a huge&lt;br /&gt;Rs 1,550 crore now.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;M&amp;M wrote off around 500 Crs. from SPA.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;While I understand that there is nothing wrong in deferring the&lt;br /&gt;genuine product development expenditure which is going to pay off in&lt;br /&gt;later years, I have 2 serious objections.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. I'm skeptical about the type of expenditure being charged into&lt;br /&gt;Deferred Revenue account. I read a document on guidelines for&lt;br /&gt;accounting for such costs.&lt;br /&gt;Monograph on Accounting for Research and Development Cost&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.aicmas.com/rd.doc"&gt;http://www.aicmas.com/rd.doc&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Page 13 of this document sets out what can be termed as a Research and&lt;br /&gt;Development cost. It further adds "The amount of the research and&lt;br /&gt;development costs described above should be charged as an expense of&lt;br /&gt;the period in which they are incurred except to the extent that&lt;br /&gt;development costs are deferred in accordance with the following&lt;br /&gt;paragraph" In page 14 it describes what can be deferred.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The essence of this document is that you can defer the costs only when&lt;br /&gt;you can reasonably expect the costs to be recovered from future&lt;br /&gt;revenues. However the trend I noticed in Indian companies is to treat&lt;br /&gt;it as "when you can dream the costs to be recovered from future&lt;br /&gt;revenues". All the new product developments are straight away being&lt;br /&gt;deferred regardless of their commercial viability. You can see this by&lt;br /&gt;looking at low R&amp;amp;D expenses of Indian Companies because they never&lt;br /&gt;account for it in the year such costs are incurred but defer it for&lt;br /&gt;later periods.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. The second and most significant objection to this related to&lt;br /&gt;avoiding amortization of such costs. You say that I've spent 100 crs.&lt;br /&gt;this year on R&amp;D and I'll recover that in future revenues and hence&lt;br /&gt;you don't treat 100 crs. as expenditure but defer it. Next year you&lt;br /&gt;write of 100 crs from balance sheet. Let's assume our R&amp;amp;D pays off and&lt;br /&gt;you make 30 Crs. per year for next 10 years. As you have already&lt;br /&gt;written off the costs you would report 30 Cr p.a. profit. Had you not&lt;br /&gt;done, and amortized the costs over 10 years, your profits would have&lt;br /&gt;been 20 crs. p.a.&lt;br /&gt;And what if the product fails. If you write off your mistakes will&lt;br /&gt;never be visible in the income statements and quarterly results. After&lt;br /&gt;all in a world blinded by Q on Q growth who has the patience to read&lt;br /&gt;balance sheets!!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The guidelines clearly say "If development costs of a project are&lt;br /&gt;deferred, they should be allocated on a systematic basis to future&lt;br /&gt;accounting period by reference either to the sale of use of the&lt;br /&gt;product or process or to the time period over which the product or&lt;br /&gt;process is expected to be sold or used"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is clear that any such write offs will give incorrect picture of&lt;br /&gt;the future earnings. Now coming back to Indian companies, I'm&lt;br /&gt;surprised that the managements have lauded their decisions to resort&lt;br /&gt;to such "deceptive" tricks.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An excerpt from Tata Motors report&lt;br /&gt;`Telco has recently written off assets and expenses to the tune of Rs&lt;br /&gt;1,180 crore from its balance sheet against its securities premium&lt;br /&gt;account (SPA), thereby eroding its reserves by 40 per cent and net&lt;br /&gt;worth by 36 per cent. The company has written off deferred revenue&lt;br /&gt;expenses on account of product development and employee separation of&lt;br /&gt;Rs 933 crore, accounting for the bulk of the write-off. The write-off&lt;br /&gt;due to the fall in the value of investments and fixed assets is Rs 32&lt;br /&gt;crore and Rs 215 crore respectively.&lt;br /&gt;According to Mr Kadle: "The rightsizing of the balancesheet will give&lt;br /&gt;a true reflection of the company in the future years. This is not the&lt;br /&gt;end of the restructuring process. We are looking at further cost&lt;br /&gt;reduction and the requirements of working capital." `&lt;br /&gt;Other companies are no different in their description of "financial&lt;br /&gt;restructuring"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As an analyst I don't care what the managements say but any deviation&lt;br /&gt;from standard accounting practices makes my life difficult. I'm unable&lt;br /&gt;to delegate my analysis process to my analytical models and I'm forced&lt;br /&gt;to do a case by case analysis. The legalese used in notes to accounts&lt;br /&gt;makes it even more difficult to understand what's happening.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;let's take an example. Tata Motors had spent around 1400 Crs. on&lt;br /&gt;development of Indica. Out of that they deferred 1000 Crs. and then&lt;br /&gt;wrote it off by charging it to SPA. Now I should amortize it over a&lt;br /&gt;period same as expected life time of the product. I'll to make a&lt;br /&gt;guess here and take a random 10 year period. You would notice that the&lt;br /&gt;write off has significant impact of jacking up profits. More than this&lt;br /&gt;it gives very incorrect picture of the Return on Net Worth(RONW). The&lt;br /&gt;numerator(Profit) is jacked up as there is no ammortization. The&lt;br /&gt;denominator is braught down because the net worth is brought down by&lt;br /&gt;write off. The results are obvious. In case of Tata Motors the RONW is&lt;br /&gt;24.2% for FY03-04 and 30.16% for FY04-05. No auto company in the world&lt;br /&gt;generates such returns on networth(GM -15.56%, Toyota 12.94%, Ford&lt;br /&gt;13.49%, Daimler Chrysler 6.59%). If you adjust the book value and&lt;br /&gt;account for amortization the RONW comes to more reasonable figures 15%&lt;br /&gt;and 20% for last 2 years. Looking at the results of Tata Motors for&lt;br /&gt;last 15 years you would realize that the CAGR of its book value(even&lt;br /&gt;after adding back the 1180 crs) is ONLY 6.83%. Taking dividends into&lt;br /&gt;account the returns come to 12.38% p.a. This shows to what extent the&lt;br /&gt;write offs skew the real picture. (For detailed calculations refer to&lt;br /&gt;the following file)&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/files/A%20School/tataMotors-Writeoff.xls"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/files/A%20School/tataMotors-Writeoff.xls&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Some people go even farther to skew the reality using prism of their&lt;br /&gt;wishful thinking and their ignorance of valuation concepts. If a&lt;br /&gt;company has average RONW of r and has dividend retention ratio b then&lt;br /&gt;the expected growth rate would be r*b. With the jacked up RONW of 30%&lt;br /&gt;in case of Tata Motors and taking average retention ratio of 55% you&lt;br /&gt;can get a Expected long term growth rate of 16.5%. The they calculate&lt;br /&gt;FY07 EPS and multiply it with P/E based on 16.5% long term growth&lt;br /&gt;rate. If you do this you can stretch the valuations like rubber band.&lt;br /&gt;I see renowned analysts applying such faulty logic every day.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To summarize, analysts should make the adjustments for such write offs&lt;br /&gt;because if you don't, you would end up with grossly incorrect picture&lt;br /&gt;of company's profitability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 20, 2005&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1672&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646878859941603?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646878859941603/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646878859941603' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646878859941603'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646878859941603'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/deferred-revenue-expenditure.html' title='Deferred Revenue Expenditure'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646866254911245</id><published>2006-05-01T00:30:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:31:02.650-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Corporate (Mis)Governance Index</title><content type='html'>I would like to share some of the methods I use to quantify "Lack of&lt;br /&gt;Corporate Governance". These simple and unorthodox methods may not&lt;br /&gt;sound convincing but they work.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 2003 I realized that most of my mistakes in past 2 years were&lt;br /&gt;occurring due to inability to filter out dishonest managements. After&lt;br /&gt;looking various texts I was unable to come out with anything concrete.&lt;br /&gt;That year I started work on a Corporate (Mis)Governance Index.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would admit that&lt;br /&gt;1.The initial target was to create a Corporate Governance Index. After&lt;br /&gt;failing on this I tried the reverse and created Corporate&lt;br /&gt;(Mis)Governance Index.&lt;br /&gt;2. Initially I was skeptical of any success in this project. But the&lt;br /&gt;experience of last 3 years has shown that these homegrown tricks are&lt;br /&gt;better than having no clue.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;here is the methodology I use(Don't laugh at it till you try!!)&lt;br /&gt;1. Check board composition.&lt;br /&gt;variables :&lt;br /&gt;a. Number of people of the same surname in the board i.e. no of&lt;br /&gt;Ambani's in RIL board. With some knowledge you can also add related&lt;br /&gt;surnames:). Check both absolute and percentage of total board strength&lt;br /&gt;Interpretation: &gt;3 or 16.66% means bad, &gt;4 or &gt;25% is too bad&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;b. Number of executive directors from the pervious set (point a)&lt;br /&gt;Interpretation: Little fuzzy here. If the ratio is too high that means&lt;br /&gt;they are paying all their uncles and nephews fat salaries. If its too&lt;br /&gt;low it means they have added even 'Mataa jii' to the board.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;c. Find number of non-working directors. (Mother's, sons, daughters of&lt;br /&gt;main promotor who never attend a board meeting)&lt;br /&gt;Criteria: people who skipped more than 1/3 of the board meetings. Give&lt;br /&gt;AGM, EGMs extra weightage.&lt;br /&gt;Interpretation: This is to find the how many of the family members are&lt;br /&gt;there on board just for the heck of it. Sometimes it also points out&lt;br /&gt;independent directors who are just pawns of promoters.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;d. Total salaries + commissions + bonuses as a percentage of Net&lt;br /&gt;profits (take average of last 3 year's profit because 100% jump in&lt;br /&gt;profit shouldn't mean 100% hike in salaries)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;e. Check the history of equity dilution. You can find this in any&lt;br /&gt;financial website like IciciDirect.&lt;br /&gt;Search for word preferential allotment. Can't find it use google!&lt;br /&gt;Interpretation: Preferential allotment at low prices is the most&lt;br /&gt;misused tool in the times of bearish markets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;f. Check history of mergers and acquisitions. If you find that there&lt;br /&gt;are acquisitions of companies where promoters held 100% stake, you can&lt;br /&gt;be sure that the parent company would have paid hefty price.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;g. Similarly check for the divestment/ de-mergers /sellouts. Check the&lt;br /&gt;price the company got out of them and who bought the assets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;h. You can also check the ratio of independant directors. In my tests&lt;br /&gt;it hasn't helped in a single case(not sure why)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The data about points a -d is available on the annual reports. Don't&lt;br /&gt;ignore the corporate communications that the companies send as&lt;br /&gt;worthless crap. Atleast read the salary increases part!.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As for f, g, h experience helps. One reason why I never start with&lt;br /&gt;high investment ina company is that it takes time to come to know&lt;br /&gt;about a company. Once you hold some stake your eyes are on lookout for&lt;br /&gt;news about the company and you would learn to see the instances of&lt;br /&gt;misdemeanor.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Some interesting cases of high Corporate MisGovernance Index&lt;br /&gt;1. Penta Media (scored on virtually every point)&lt;br /&gt;2. Reliance group (scored very high on a-d)&lt;br /&gt;3. Sah petroleum (small company which came out with IPO. The faily&lt;br /&gt;members take 8.5% of profits home!!)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Some of the companies from LWb Special whose scrored were relatively&lt;br /&gt;higher are Jindal Steel and Power &amp; Sterlite.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The companies which scroed zero on Corporate MisGovernance Index&lt;br /&gt;include HDFC, ITC, HLL, INFY. It just shows that this index is not&lt;br /&gt;exhaustive enough to measure MisGovernance by professionals.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Surprisingly all PSU's scored low on Corporate MisGovernance Index.&lt;br /&gt;may be that's becasue the index doesn't measure lack of&lt;br /&gt;disclosures/lack of foresight etc.&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646866254911245?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646866254911245/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646866254911245' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646866254911245'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646866254911245'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/corporate-misgovernance-index.html' title='Corporate (Mis)Governance Index'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646856369640075</id><published>2006-05-01T00:28:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:29:24.500-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Mutual Fund selection</title><content type='html'>"The dumbest reason in the world to buy a stock is because it's going&lt;br /&gt;up" – Warren Buffett&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would say the next dumbest thing would be to buy a mutual fund&lt;br /&gt;scheme just because it's NAV is going up. But that's exactly what the&lt;br /&gt;investors do when they buy mutual funds on the basis of short term&lt;br /&gt;performance. I read an artcile about the (in)consistency of mutual&lt;br /&gt;fund performance.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EXCERPT: "The S&amp;amp;P's Mutual Fund Performance Persistence Scorecard&lt;br /&gt;(link opens a PDF file) measured the consistency of top-performing&lt;br /&gt;mutual funds over three and five consecutive years. As of May 31, only&lt;br /&gt;10.7% of large-cap funds, 9.2% of mid-cap funds, and 11.5% of&lt;br /&gt;small-cap funds maintained a top-quartile ranking for three&lt;br /&gt;consecutive years. Which is to say that only one in every 10&lt;br /&gt;top-performing funds in a given year stays in the top 25% for the next&lt;br /&gt;two"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is a word of caution for the investors who think that they are&lt;br /&gt;making intelligent decision than the people jumping directly into&lt;br /&gt;markets. After all, if you fall from 10th floor it hardy matters if&lt;br /&gt;fell from the window or you were inside a lift which fell 10 floors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The article further goes on to suggest that you should carefully note&lt;br /&gt;the expense ratio of the fund. As per the author, one of the golden&lt;br /&gt;rule is "If you are investing in mutual funds, look for funds with an&lt;br /&gt;expense ratio of less than 1%".&lt;br /&gt;In India most of the equity funds have expenses ratio higher than 2%&lt;br /&gt;which means that Indian investors have more reasons to worry.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Read the complete article at.&lt;br /&gt;Beware of Dogs&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2005/commentary05102707.htm"&gt;http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2005/commentary05102707.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; If you want to know more about expense ration read the following post&lt;br /&gt;Expense ratio : The indicator of Mutual fund costs&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/822"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/822&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:Oct 10, 2005&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1572&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/tt&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646856369640075?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646856369640075/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646856369640075' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646856369640075'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646856369640075'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/mutual-fund-selection.html' title='Mutual Fund selection'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646845573912676</id><published>2006-05-01T00:26:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:27:35.803-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Investment vs Speculation</title><content type='html'>In every bull run the media reports are full of the references to the&lt;br /&gt;return of the Small Investors to the equity markets. Lured by the&lt;br /&gt;headlines of Sensex crossing 8000 and stories of neighbor making huge&lt;br /&gt;money, otherwise intelligent people, decide to try their luck in the&lt;br /&gt;markets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I find the word Small Investor little misleading. The term is used for&lt;br /&gt;the people who are really Small Speculator but think that they are&lt;br /&gt;investing. It is very important to make the distinction between the&lt;br /&gt;two. Any advise which is valuable to the investors, can be dangerous&lt;br /&gt;for the speculators. Before I go on to explain this I want to put&lt;br /&gt;forward the definition of investment as given by Benjamin Graham&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis promises&lt;br /&gt;safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting&lt;br /&gt;these requirements are speculative."&lt;br /&gt;Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis (original 1934 edition)&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0070244960/investorhomeA/"&gt;http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0070244960/investorhomeA/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; Graham goes further to suggest that speculation is not wrong but&lt;br /&gt;entirely different ball game and should not be confused with investment.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"Outright speculation is neither illegal, immoral, nor (for most&lt;br /&gt;people) fattening to the pocketbook . . . There is intelligent&lt;br /&gt;speculation as there is intelligent investing. But there are many ways&lt;br /&gt;in which speculation may be unintelligent. Of these the foremost are:&lt;br /&gt;(1) speculating when you think you are investing; (2) speculating&lt;br /&gt;seriously instead of as a pastime, when you lack proper knowledge and&lt;br /&gt;skill for it; and (3) risking more money in speculation than you can&lt;br /&gt;afford to lose. . . everyone who buys a so-called "hot" common-stock&lt;br /&gt;issue, or makes a purchase in any way similar thereto, is either&lt;br /&gt;speculating or gambling. Speculation is always fascinating, and it can&lt;br /&gt;be a lot of fun while you are ahead of the game. If you want to try&lt;br /&gt;your luck, put aside a portion--the smaller the better--of your&lt;br /&gt;capital in a separate fund for this purpose. Never add more money to&lt;br /&gt;this account just because the market has gone up and profits are&lt;br /&gt;rolling in. (That's the time to think of taking money out of your&lt;br /&gt;speculative funds.) Never mingle your speculative and investment&lt;br /&gt;operations in the same account, nor in any part of your thinking"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Benjamin Graham in The Intelligent Investor&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0060155477/investorhomeA/"&gt;http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0060155477/investorhomeA/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; When you speculate on a stock while thinking that you are investing,&lt;br /&gt;the time tested principles of investing can do you more harm than&lt;br /&gt;good. For instance take "Buy and Hold" approach. The investors who&lt;br /&gt;have done property analysis can afford to hold the stock even if the&lt;br /&gt;price goes down. If they are really sure about their reasoning they&lt;br /&gt;can (and they should) increase their investment as the price goes&lt;br /&gt;down. The same is not true for the speculator who is investing in a&lt;br /&gt;penny stock. He can lose his entire amount just by waiting for the&lt;br /&gt;time stock goes up.&lt;br /&gt;The same goes with diversification. If you buy all slots of a&lt;br /&gt;roulette, you have a 100% chance of losing money equal to the %&lt;br /&gt;charged by the Casino. Similarly if you try to be a contrarian when&lt;br /&gt;you know less than what market knows you would lose more that you&lt;br /&gt;would by following the trend.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;That brings me to the question I want you to answer for yourself. Are&lt;br /&gt;you sure that you are not a speculator?&lt;br /&gt;If you don't know the answer then you can get the answer the&lt;br /&gt;following question.&lt;br /&gt;(a) Do you know about the main products/business of the company you&lt;br /&gt;have invested in?&lt;br /&gt;(b) Can you tell , with (+-)50% accuracy, the revenues or profits of&lt;br /&gt;the company.&lt;br /&gt;(c)Have you ever checked the financials or results of the company?&lt;br /&gt;(d) Do you have some reasonable expectation about the returns from the&lt;br /&gt;money you have put in the stock and have you compared those&lt;br /&gt;expectations with the returns available from other non-equity&lt;br /&gt;investments?&lt;br /&gt;(e) Do you have some estimate on risk that you are undertaking, e.g in&lt;br /&gt;worst-case scenario how much you can lose.&lt;br /&gt;(f) Have you done more than a day of homework per stock before forming&lt;br /&gt;your expectations and risk estimates?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you answer more than 4 of the above question as NO than you are&lt;br /&gt;definitely an speculator irrespective of your opinion. If you have&lt;br /&gt;answered at least one NO then you would be better of undertaking&lt;br /&gt;investment under guidance from experts. Finally, if you have answered&lt;br /&gt;all of this as yes it is difficult to guess whether you are an&lt;br /&gt;investor but you are definitely on the way.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;None of the points mentioned above are for discouraging or disparaging&lt;br /&gt;speculation. Very few people in the group would know that I'm an&lt;br /&gt;expert gambler but I never speculate in the markets….And I know, it&lt;br /&gt;pays to be really sure when you are speculating.&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:&lt;/tt&gt;Oct 19, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;tt&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1588"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1588&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646845573912676?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646845573912676/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646845573912676' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646845573912676'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646845573912676'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/investment-vs-speculation.html' title='Investment vs Speculation'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646819405849031</id><published>2006-05-01T00:21:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:23:14.156-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Holding company structure</title><content type='html'>Holding companies are a tool used by promoters to retain management&lt;br /&gt;control over companies with minimum amount of investment.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Assuming you want to retain management control of a company A which&lt;br /&gt;has 100 Crs of paid up capital. You need to shell out 33 crs. to get&lt;br /&gt;33% share which can give you control if no other shareholder hold that&lt;br /&gt;much stake. Assuming you have a holding company B where you have&lt;br /&gt;management control with 51% stake. If B holds 33% stake in A then B&lt;br /&gt;gets management control over A.&lt;br /&gt;Now think how much you will have to pay to get 51% of B ? Assuming B&lt;br /&gt;the only asset of B is its holdings in A and its paid up capital is 33&lt;br /&gt;crs. You will have to pay only 17.5 crores to get management control&lt;br /&gt;over B and by virtue of its 33% stake in A you get management control&lt;br /&gt;over A.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is one of the many benefits promoters get using holding company&lt;br /&gt;structure. You can create a pyramid of holding companies and get&lt;br /&gt;management control over large companies with personal holdings as&lt;br /&gt;small as 5 -10%.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Other benefits include fooling the creditors to supply loans of&lt;br /&gt;disproportionate sizes. As a promoter your interest would lie in&lt;br /&gt;retaining control with as minimum investment possible. If you get the&lt;br /&gt;creditors to pay 100 cr loans on equity of 50 crs, you can get 33%&lt;br /&gt;stake in a company with 150 crore assets , by paying just 17 crs.&lt;br /&gt;Obviously no sane banker should pay loan as high as this but here the&lt;br /&gt;holding company comes to rescue. For instance, Reliance paid loans&lt;br /&gt;worth 12000 crs. to Reliance Infocomm when Reliance Infocomm's equity&lt;br /&gt;was around 450 crs, that to at 8% interest rates.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;That's another reason why its is unreasonable to expect the promoters&lt;br /&gt;to unlock the value by resolving such structures even though the&lt;br /&gt;holding companies remain undervalued for long periods of time. They&lt;br /&gt;can keep increasing their stake in the holding company by creeping&lt;br /&gt;acquisition.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In nutshell, the investors of the holding companies fund your&lt;br /&gt;investment in the subsidiaries and help to getting top management&lt;br /&gt;positions with fat pay checks as large as 1-2% of net profits of the&lt;br /&gt;subsidiary.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;that's why the investors have to bee very cautious and very patient&lt;br /&gt;when dealing with investments in holding companies. Its a complicated&lt;br /&gt;business and should never be attempted unless you know enough abut&lt;br /&gt;these tricks&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646819405849031?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646819405849031/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646819405849031' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646819405849031'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646819405849031'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/holding-company-structure.html' title='Holding company structure'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646808358470071</id><published>2006-05-01T00:15:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:21:24.056-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Valuations in India compared to other emerging markets</title><content type='html'>&lt;tt&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;In last weeks I had explained the fact that the&lt;br /&gt;market capitalization of Indian equity markets seems on a higher side&lt;br /&gt;in comparison to India's GDP. I've been able to get hold of some data&lt;br /&gt;to support this claim. Here are the figures of market Cap to GDP&lt;br /&gt;ratios of different countries(based on data from World bank on GDP for&lt;br /&gt;FY 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;USA 132.2%&lt;br /&gt;UK 132.1%&lt;br /&gt;taiwan 87.0%&lt;br /&gt;japan 80.3%&lt;br /&gt;S. Koria 77.2%&lt;br /&gt;India 64.9%&lt;br /&gt;Russia 57.7%&lt;br /&gt;Brasil 55.6%&lt;br /&gt;China 22.7%&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Please note that this ratio is not a single yardstick to measure the&lt;br /&gt;relative valuations because the ratio depends following factors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Ratio of listed companies compared to the unlisted companies (which explains why china's M.Cap/GDOP ratio is low)&lt;br /&gt;2. ratio of contribution of unorganized sector to the organized sector.&lt;br /&gt;3. Prospects of growth(higher the growth prospects the higher would be the ratio)&lt;br /&gt;4. Interest rates (Low long term interest rates would result in higher valuations)&lt;br /&gt;5. Risk premium (if the systematic risk are high the valuations would be low)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Even after accunting for expected growth I find it difficult to&lt;br /&gt;justify assumtions that equities can yield 20%+ gains in coming years.&lt;br /&gt;hence I believe that the markets are going to give returns of 11-13%&lt;br /&gt;in next 5 years. While these returns are pretty good it implies a risk&lt;br /&gt;premium of 3.5% to 5.5% over risk free rate. This may not be enough to&lt;br /&gt;justify investment in stocks in general. This means that you should&lt;br /&gt;concentrate your holdings into only those stocks where the prospects&lt;br /&gt;of high returns justify the risk you are taking.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Aug 22, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1503"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1503&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646808358470071?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646808358470071/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646808358470071' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646808358470071'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646808358470071'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/valuations-in-india-compared-to-other.html' title='Valuations in India compared to other emerging markets'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646741464190080</id><published>2006-05-01T00:10:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T01:06:35.163-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Why Diversify?</title><content type='html'>You may have heard of the oft repeated advise about not putting all&lt;br /&gt;the eggs in a single basket. It is repeated so often that people want&lt;br /&gt;to rebel against it. But I think diversification is a theory which has&lt;br /&gt;sound mathematical basis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Assume that you and me decide to gamble on 1 lack rupees on a toss of&lt;br /&gt;a coin. Also assume that you have a special coin which churns out&lt;br /&gt;head 70% of time and tail 30% of time and you have the liberty to pick&lt;br /&gt;up your choice(head or tail). You can also choose how much you would&lt;br /&gt;bet on 1 toss.. i.e that you can toss the coin 1 lack times by betting&lt;br /&gt;1 rupee on each toss or you can put entire 1 lack rupees at stake in 1&lt;br /&gt;toss.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What would be your strategy? How many times would you throw up the&lt;br /&gt;coin? If you had read the chapter on probabilities well, you should&lt;br /&gt;bet 1 lack times on getting head and you have assured chances of&lt;br /&gt;winning approximately 40000 Rs. If you decide to bet 1 lack in a&lt;br /&gt;single toss of coin you may lose up to 1 lack or win 1 lack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Clearly the choice is yours. In equity investment, there are no risk&lt;br /&gt;free bets just as there are no coins without a flip side.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In such cases diversification increases your probability adjusted returns.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Having said that diversification is necessary but not sufficient&lt;br /&gt;condition to safer returns. This is because if there is any&lt;br /&gt;correlation between returns of the stocks in which you have&lt;br /&gt;diversified you may lose in all of them if things turn worse.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Also there are risk involved in over diversification because of the&lt;br /&gt;transaction costs. Another reason is that it is difficult to find more&lt;br /&gt;than a few stocks where you can get 70% chance of returns. This means&lt;br /&gt;that the more you diversify, the closer you get to average performers.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My personal view is that an equity portfolio having less than 7 stocks&lt;br /&gt;or more than 25 stocks is badly designed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: July 21, 2005&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1462"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1462&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646741464190080?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646741464190080/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646741464190080' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646741464190080'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646741464190080'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/why-diversify.html' title='Why Diversify?'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646714424904407</id><published>2006-05-01T00:04:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:05:44.370-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Housing prices: Are we building castles in air</title><content type='html'>Last week I read an insightful article in The Economist on the Global&lt;br /&gt;housing boom and the high probability of impending crash. I was quite&lt;br /&gt;interested to get some information about real estate market which is&lt;br /&gt;not my home turf. Though the analysis of housing market in India is&lt;br /&gt;difficult task due to lack of information, lack of transparent legal&lt;br /&gt;structure to support property rights and an inefficient market, I&lt;br /&gt;would still like to initiate a discussion about housing prices in India.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To my mind investment in the Real Estate is like any other investment&lt;br /&gt;with risk and rewards associated with it. But the majority of people&lt;br /&gt;do not think about the risks in investing in real estate because they&lt;br /&gt;think the prices will always go up. They usually base their arguments&lt;br /&gt;on the fact that the supply of land is limited and the demand keeps&lt;br /&gt;growing. However history doesn't back this argument. ( In the links to&lt;br /&gt;the articles you would find some instances of sever crashes in real&lt;br /&gt;estate prices and the reasons why it happened)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As an investment real estate investment has some interesting&lt;br /&gt;characteristics. At least till your first house, the home acts both as&lt;br /&gt;an investment and a consumable commodity. In that sense if you live in&lt;br /&gt;a house you own you would not be in particular hurry to sell it just&lt;br /&gt;because prices are falling.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But to reverse the argument would you buy a house just because you&lt;br /&gt;have enough money to buy or enough cheap loan available to buy it.&lt;br /&gt;Without giving any recommendations I would give you an interesting&lt;br /&gt;scenario of my own rented flat. The rent is 14,000 p.a. with 5%&lt;br /&gt;increase per year. If I want to purchase the house I'll have to pay&lt;br /&gt;approx. 40 lacks.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If I use discounted cash flow model to determine how much time it&lt;br /&gt;would take for me to break even with the rent saved at this price and&lt;br /&gt;using risk free rate of 7.5%, it would be take me 36 years.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For obvious reasons I'm not interested to buy this house(or any house&lt;br /&gt;for that matter, even though I afford one and I need one). So this&lt;br /&gt;equation is simply not adding up. To make LHS= RHS one of the&lt;br /&gt;following has to occur.&lt;br /&gt;1. The rents will go up by more that 5%&lt;br /&gt;2. The long term interest rates will come down&lt;br /&gt;3. The price of the house comes down&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The option 1 is rules out unless the prices in entire city move up. At&lt;br /&gt;the rent I'm paying is on the higher side and I don't think that it&lt;br /&gt;can go up further.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The long term interest rate are on the lower side now and will not&lt;br /&gt;move down further unless there are structural changes in Indian Economy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The last option seems more likely (I know you would disagree!). Two&lt;br /&gt;years ago the prices were close to 28 lacs. In the last 2 years the&lt;br /&gt;rents have moved up by 10-15% and the prices by 60%.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My case may be one off case. I want you to do the same analysis(or&lt;br /&gt;send me data) and figure out for yourself if the house is worth buying.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now the story is same globally. People are paying more price to buy&lt;br /&gt;house than the returns they can get from them in their lifetime. the&lt;br /&gt;argument is the same that the prices will go up and up.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would leave you here with the following articles. Hope that you&lt;br /&gt;would send your opinions even if you don't agree with me or The Economist.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The global housing boom: In come the waves&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4079027"&gt;http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4079027&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;House prices : After the fall&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4079458"&gt;http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4079458&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Beware housing bubble: HDFC Chairman&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13875692"&gt;http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13875692&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646714424904407?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646714424904407/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646714424904407' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646714424904407'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646714424904407'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/housing-prices-are-we-building-castles.html' title='Housing prices: Are we building castles in air'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646705222330175</id><published>2006-05-01T00:03:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:04:12.286-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Bonus shares - why bother?</title><content type='html'>The declaration of the bonus can be thought of as recognition of&lt;br /&gt;additional equity capital provided by the investors by virtue of&lt;br /&gt;agreeing to reinvest part of the profits. To understand this, let's&lt;br /&gt;assume that a company X has a equity capital of Rs. 100 crs and no&lt;br /&gt;accumulated profits. The company X earns 20 Crs and pays 5 Cr. as&lt;br /&gt;dividends. Also assume that there is another company Y, which is&lt;br /&gt;similar in all aspect to company X but gives entire 20 Crs as&lt;br /&gt;dividend. Assuming that the profits and all other variables remain&lt;br /&gt;same the company X would have a networth of Rs. 175 Crs. and Y would&lt;br /&gt;have a networth of 100 Crs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the year 5 if both X and Y pay 20 Crs dividend which company has&lt;br /&gt;higher payout ratio? same..they both have 100 Cr. equity and they both&lt;br /&gt;pay 20 Crs. However we are ignoring the aspect that the shareholders&lt;br /&gt;of company X have put additional 75 Crs. of capital in the company by&lt;br /&gt;investing part of profits.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If the company X gives a bonus it is recognizing the fact that the&lt;br /&gt;shareholders have provided additional capital by allowing the company&lt;br /&gt;to deploy profits back to the business. This expanded capital base&lt;br /&gt;need to be serviced through dividend and if a company recognizes the&lt;br /&gt;contribution then it is highly likely to raise dividend payout.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;All this may sound highly theoretical because the capital structure&lt;br /&gt;doesn't change a bit through bonus. However, empirical evidence&lt;br /&gt;suggests that bonus issues imply higher dividends in longer term. To&lt;br /&gt;that extent the favorable opinion about bonus issues is logical up to&lt;br /&gt;a certain limit.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The reaction of the market is many times exaggerated. Many analysts&lt;br /&gt;seems to overvalue the advantages of more liquidity provided by the&lt;br /&gt;bonus but I think it is of very limited long lasting value. The stock&lt;br /&gt;splits serve the same purpose as bonus as far as liquidity is&lt;br /&gt;concerned but they have no long term consequences.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In economics and finance, the expectation of change of variables is&lt;br /&gt;more powerful factor than the change in variable. The variable in this&lt;br /&gt;case happens to be the dividend. The bonus also raises expectation&lt;br /&gt;that the profits are less likely to fall from current levels because a&lt;br /&gt;conservative management would never like to reduce the dividend payout&lt;br /&gt;even in bad times.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This subject has been nicely explained in the Intelligent Investor by Graham and&lt;br /&gt;you can refer the book for more details.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Jul 1, 2005 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1439"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1439&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646705222330175?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646705222330175/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646705222330175' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646705222330175'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646705222330175'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/bonus-shares-why-bother.html' title='Bonus shares - why bother?'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646696917430099</id><published>2006-05-01T00:01:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:02:56.926-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Investing in holding companies</title><content type='html'>Holding companies make a good target for the value investors. I have&lt;br /&gt;used this quite effectively in the past in case of M&amp;M/Sterlite etc.&lt;br /&gt;The principles I follow in these cases are as follows;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1.Analyze the companies independently to judge the prospects of&lt;br /&gt;subsidiaries by themselves.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2.Find out the triggers of unlocking the value in the subsidiaries.&lt;br /&gt;That may not necessarily mean that subsidiaries need to be made public&lt;br /&gt;or sold. it simply means whether they would achieve the critical mass&lt;br /&gt;to make the market realize their worth. In fact if a holding company&lt;br /&gt;has stake in a strong subsidiary then by the value investing&lt;br /&gt;principles it may not make sense to divest the stake.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3.Find out the pitfalls.&lt;br /&gt;a.Figure out why such holding structure is created. Many times the&lt;br /&gt;companies do this to hide debts in the books of subsidiaries. The&lt;br /&gt;extreme example of this is pyramiding capital structure, a la Enron.&lt;br /&gt;b.Check if the parent company is using transfer pricing to sell the&lt;br /&gt;products at higher price then it can get in the markets and booking&lt;br /&gt;profits whereas the subsidiary is suffering from losses.&lt;br /&gt;c.Avoid complicated structures with substantial cross holding&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4.Check if there are any synergies in the business of parent company&lt;br /&gt;and the subsidiaries. History shows that diversified companies making&lt;br /&gt;everything from steel to software are unable to remain focused in&lt;br /&gt;disparate businesses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;5.Check if the managements of the subsidiaries have enough expertise&lt;br /&gt;and freedom to shape the future of the subsidiary.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;6.Having done all of the above mentioned analysis, evaluate the value&lt;br /&gt;of the interest of the parent company in the subsidiary. You can get&lt;br /&gt;this by looking into the consolidated accounts. Here a catch is that&lt;br /&gt;the accounting norms do not force the company to consolidate the&lt;br /&gt;accounts for the subsidiaries where the parent company holds less than&lt;br /&gt;505 stake. Reliance Infocomm is the case to the point.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;7.If you can determine with reasonable degree of confidence that that&lt;br /&gt;the total value of the consolidated enterprise is more then what&lt;br /&gt;market estimates buy it. But you got be very patient in such cases&lt;br /&gt;because it may take years before market realizes that.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: June 20, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1435"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1435&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646696917430099?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646696917430099/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646696917430099' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646696917430099'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646696917430099'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/05/investing-in-holding-companies.html' title='Investing in holding companies'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646686410756325</id><published>2006-04-30T23:57:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-01T00:01:04.230-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Oil Prices</title><content type='html'>I'm getting increasingly sceptical of macro economic forecasts made by&lt;br /&gt;leading economic insttitutions and economic journals. Six months ago&lt;br /&gt;when oil prices crossed the comfort zone, all analysts had said that&lt;br /&gt;if oil remains at these levels the world economy will go into&lt;br /&gt;recession. Well six months are over and oil prices have continued&lt;br /&gt;their northward run but the global economic health seems as good as ever.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This not only raises doubts on capabilities to make such predictions&lt;br /&gt;but also coroborates views of Buffett regarding giving low priority to&lt;br /&gt;macro economic factors. He says "When investing, we view ourselves as&lt;br /&gt;business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic&lt;br /&gt;analysts, and not even as security analysts. "&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These variables are very difficult to predict and investors are better&lt;br /&gt;of by ignoring them unless they themselves are very sure of the their&lt;br /&gt;analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Having said that I'm not concluding that the high oil prices will have&lt;br /&gt;no impact but we have to take the predictions of the extent of impact&lt;br /&gt;and time with a pinch of salt.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:Apr 5, 2005&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1393&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646686410756325?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646686410756325/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646686410756325' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646686410756325'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646686410756325'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/oil-prices.html' title='Oil Prices'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646647172645707</id><published>2006-04-30T23:53:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:56:15.920-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Effect of exchange rate movements</title><content type='html'>In a perfect economic system, the changes in relative strength of a&lt;br /&gt;currency should not affect the relative strength of any other 2&lt;br /&gt;currencies. However, we live in an imperfect world. The currencies of&lt;br /&gt;various economies are market driven to a different extent.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For instance, Chinese Yuan is pegged to dollar. Indian rupee in partly&lt;br /&gt;market driven and any major move is scuttled by RBI through open&lt;br /&gt;market operations. In such a case if the dollar loses strength it will&lt;br /&gt;not only affect the trade equation between India and US but it will&lt;br /&gt;have impact on trade equation between India and any other country.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If rupee appreciates against dollar but Yuan doesn't then the Indian&lt;br /&gt;export will become less competitive in compared to Chinese exports.&lt;br /&gt;These countries compete in many areas and dollar devaluation can&lt;br /&gt;affect the economies quite a bit.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;More specific impacts of weakening dollar are listed below:&lt;br /&gt;1. Company's who have raised debt through ECBs denominated in dollars&lt;br /&gt;would gain because they have to pay back fewer amounts in rupees.&lt;br /&gt;2. Companies with dollar denominated exports will suffer exchange&lt;br /&gt;losses. Such losses can amount to large figures unless company&lt;br /&gt;actively manages exchange risk.&lt;br /&gt;3. Companies which are importing dollar denominated goods/raw material&lt;br /&gt;like capital goods/crude etc will benefit from lower cost.&lt;br /&gt;4. Companies competing against countries like china will suffer due to&lt;br /&gt;relative appreciation of their currency against an inflexible/pegged&lt;br /&gt;currency.&lt;br /&gt;5. India's 130bn $ forex reserves would lose their sheen but you will&lt;br /&gt;never see forex loss reported in any financial statement from india.&lt;br /&gt;6. A huge and unsustainable reserve position may force government to&lt;br /&gt;open up some restrictions on convertibility, foreign investment by&lt;br /&gt;Indian companies etc. This will be a beneficial impact.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To summarize I'm more worried about appreciation against competing&lt;br /&gt;Asian currencies than against dollar.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:Feb 8, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1284"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1284&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646647172645707?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646647172645707/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646647172645707' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646647172645707'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646647172645707'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/effect-of-exchange-rate-movements.html' title='Effect of exchange rate movements'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646636837228505</id><published>2006-04-30T23:51:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:52:48.506-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Strength of Currency</title><content type='html'>Understanding the interplay of exchange rates and economic implication&lt;br /&gt;is a complex subject. I would try to explain the things in layman's&lt;br /&gt;terms and would refer serious economics enthusiasts to books&lt;br /&gt;referenced at the end of this message.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Lets imagine a world without currencies and trade based on bartering&lt;br /&gt;of goods. Assume that A deal produces only spices and country B&lt;br /&gt;produces only silk. Thus these two items become their currency for&lt;br /&gt;trade. if the spices are highly sought after items then the economy of&lt;br /&gt;country A would be able to import more goods by forgoing a little part&lt;br /&gt;of their own produce, that is silk. The country would afford a large&lt;br /&gt;buying power for their produce.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 1: Strong currency is helpful to the economy.&lt;br /&gt;All the countries during the periods of their economic superiority&lt;br /&gt;have had strong currencies. The rise of Dollar along with US economy&lt;br /&gt;and fall of Rouble along with the fall of Russia are 2 examples&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now let's assume that there is another country C which produces only&lt;br /&gt;spices. To compete agaist each other to sell their spices both A and C&lt;br /&gt;will have to keep the prices of their spices at reasonable level. If&lt;br /&gt;the country C starts under pricing its spices the trade between&lt;br /&gt;country A and B will suffer and the economy of Country A be affected.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 2: A strengthening currency not helpful to the exports. If&lt;br /&gt;exports drive substantial portion of the GDP, a A strengthening&lt;br /&gt;currency is not helpful economy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The strength of economy is not directly correlated with the fortunes&lt;br /&gt;of the capital markets which represent only organized corporate&lt;br /&gt;sector. In the countries like India where FII investment is a&lt;br /&gt;significant driver in the investment decisions of market participants&lt;br /&gt;the exchange rate movement matters. This acts through the "expectation&lt;br /&gt;of change in the exchange rate" rather than change itself. If the FIIs&lt;br /&gt;think that they can generate 10% rupee returns and expect rupee to&lt;br /&gt;depreciate by 5% their dollar return becomes only 5% and they would&lt;br /&gt;rather invest in US Govt. treasuries.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If the strong currency is associated with expectation of weakening you&lt;br /&gt;would see large FII/FDI investment. If the exchange rate is expected&lt;br /&gt;to be stable it will not be a significant matter rupee trades at 40/$&lt;br /&gt;or at 50/$.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The more complicated impacts from exchange rates come in form of the&lt;br /&gt;changes in interest rates and inflation. For instance, if the dollar&lt;br /&gt;inflows cause a rupee to appreciate the RBI will have to buy Dollars&lt;br /&gt;and release rupee in the economy. This would cause inflation and rise&lt;br /&gt;in interest rates. To counter this the central banks follow&lt;br /&gt;neutralization tactics like selling Govt. bonds to mop up additional&lt;br /&gt;liquidity. I don't think that I can explain(or even i understand) this&lt;br /&gt;aspect in a message.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;None the less I can answer any specific queries you have in this&lt;br /&gt;subject and feel free to post your views.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;BOOKS:&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, by Keynes&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/keynes/john_maynard/k44g/"&gt;http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/keynes/john_maynard/k44g/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Wealth of Nations , by Adam Smith&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/s/s64w/"&gt;http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/s/s64w/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Feb 8, 2005&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1284"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1284&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646636837228505?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646636837228505/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646636837228505' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646636837228505'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646636837228505'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/strength-of-currency.html' title='Strength of Currency'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646619686334823</id><published>2006-04-30T23:44:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:49:56.963-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Diversification</title><content type='html'>Diverfification beyond a point is meaningless. For&lt;br /&gt;sure you don't need to put all the eggs in one basket but if all the&lt;br /&gt;baskets are under one roof which may fall any day then you don't&lt;br /&gt;achieve anything out of your planning.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sometime back I wrote a Note on Over-Diversification. Posting the same&lt;br /&gt;again.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To explain let us assume that the funds are invested in 20 best&lt;br /&gt;opportunities available. Had the investment been concentrated to 10&lt;br /&gt;best opportunities and the results turn out to be in sync with the&lt;br /&gt;estimation, the gains from a portfolio of top 10 companies would be&lt;br /&gt;far higher than the one with 20 companies. The risk in the latter&lt;br /&gt;would be lower but not significantly less because a substantial&lt;br /&gt;portion of risk comes from the risks inherent in economy and capital&lt;br /&gt;market.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I seek to achieve an adequate level of diversification to achieve&lt;br /&gt;`Safety of Principal' and high returns. The mutual funds due to large&lt;br /&gt;size can not deploy all their funds in 10 companies. The results is&lt;br /&gt;over diversification and lower returns. For example as of June 30th,&lt;br /&gt;2004 Morgan Stanley Growth Fund had invested in 46 listed, 7 unlisted&lt;br /&gt;and 3 ADRS. The results were obvious. In the 10 years since inception&lt;br /&gt;the NAV of the fund increased from 10.00 to Rs. 18.47. The fund has&lt;br /&gt;paid dividends of 4 Rs during this10 year period.I believe that the&lt;br /&gt;mathematical odds are stacked heavily against such over diversified&lt;br /&gt;portfolio. The managers of the fund did make money for themselves with&lt;br /&gt;1-1.25% management fee and annual administrative expense not exceeding 3%.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646619686334823?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646619686334823/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646619686334823' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646619686334823'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646619686334823'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/diversification.html' title='Diversification'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646582422387122</id><published>2006-04-30T23:43:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:43:44.276-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Effects of inflation on asset allocation</title><content type='html'>The discussion on asset allocation has led us to an important topic&lt;br /&gt;of inflation. I feel that inflation deserves a more detailed analysis&lt;br /&gt;because of the complicated ways in which it affects businesses. I'll&lt;br /&gt;try to explain this in this message.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;During inflationary period the currency loses value which cause all&lt;br /&gt;the securities denominated in that currency lose value. In case of&lt;br /&gt;long term debt the impact may be even higher because the central&lt;br /&gt;banks resort to increase in interest rates to check the inflation&lt;br /&gt;which depresses bond prices.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The real assets like properties, plants etc are less vulnerable to&lt;br /&gt;inflation because their nominal values rise along with inflation.&lt;br /&gt;However the impact is not straightforward and can be detrimental to&lt;br /&gt;the business in many ways.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EFFECT OF INFLATION OF BUSINESS&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let's enumerate the beneficial effects of inflation on business.&lt;br /&gt;B1) Inflation tends to increase the prices of assets like real&lt;br /&gt;estate, plant and machinery etc which directly adds to the nominal&lt;br /&gt;value of existing stock of capital.&lt;br /&gt;B2) The rising asset prices make affect the supply of new investments&lt;br /&gt;because rise in supply price. For example the increase in steel&lt;br /&gt;prices would mean higher cost of setting up a plant which may or may&lt;br /&gt;not provide enough returns to justify cost. This increases the&lt;br /&gt;competitiveness of existing asset base.&lt;br /&gt;B3) The fall in the value of currency decreases the indebtedness of&lt;br /&gt;the company. If a company has taken a loan of Rs. 500 crs, the fall&lt;br /&gt;in the real value of rupee will mean that the company can pay back&lt;br /&gt;with less amount of real currency.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let's enumerate the detrimental effects of inflation on business&lt;br /&gt;D1) Inflation affects the consumer demand because of increased cost&lt;br /&gt;of living which may not be offset by a rise in monetary wages.&lt;br /&gt;D2) Any increase in monetary wages due to inflation can lead to rise&lt;br /&gt;in operating cost which is risky because monetary wages tend to be&lt;br /&gt;sticky and may not decline as situations change.&lt;br /&gt;D3) Inflation increases the working capital requirements to manage&lt;br /&gt;the same level of output. This affects working capital intensive&lt;br /&gt;businesses like retail in a big way. This effect was explained by&lt;br /&gt;Buffett in his letters to shareholders during inflationary period of&lt;br /&gt;early 80's.&lt;br /&gt;D4) In a competitive environment the businesses may not be able to&lt;br /&gt;pass costs to the consumers. For example biscuit manufactures in&lt;br /&gt;India have not been able to increase prices since last 6 years even&lt;br /&gt;though the input costs have risen by more than 505 in the same period.&lt;br /&gt;D5) If Central banks raise the interest rates the valuations based on&lt;br /&gt;discounted cash flow suffer due to rise in risk free rates.&lt;br /&gt;D6) The destabilization of economic system due to high inflation&lt;br /&gt;leads to rise in risk premium.&lt;br /&gt;D7) Although the nominal values of assets like real estate, plant and&lt;br /&gt;machinery rises with inflation, the values of other assets like&lt;br /&gt;cash, investment by company in bonds etc decline. (related to B3)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EFFECT OF INFLATION OF ASSET PRICES&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The asset prices react in different ways to the rise in inflations.&lt;br /&gt;1. The hard cash has permanent loss equivalent to the inflation rate&lt;br /&gt;2. Bonds may be affected more due to compounded effects of high&lt;br /&gt;maturity and rising in interest rates. However there is a twist to&lt;br /&gt;this. If the interest rates have already moved higher with inflation&lt;br /&gt;and fall along with subsequent fall in inflations bonds may provide&lt;br /&gt;higher returns considering the risk involved.&lt;br /&gt;3. Stocks are the least affected in general. However the prices do&lt;br /&gt;not always rise with rising inflation. The inflationary period due to&lt;br /&gt;oil shock, in late 70's and early 80's in US, is a testimony&lt;br /&gt;to this.&lt;br /&gt;Between 1964 and 1981, Dow Jones remained at the same level i.e 875&lt;br /&gt;because the Fed raised interest rates from over 4% at year-end 1964&lt;br /&gt;to more than 15% by late 1981. A seventeen year bond bought in 1964&lt;br /&gt;would have given a return of 4%. Similar observations&lt;br /&gt;can be noted by comparing the performance of Indian equities in early&lt;br /&gt;90's and govt. securities.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Higher inflation is typically a characteristic of over heated economy&lt;br /&gt;which is associated with surplus liquidity, investment boom and low&lt;br /&gt;interest rates. In such cases the overriding optimism and shift to&lt;br /&gt;equities often results in high stock prices. As the effects of&lt;br /&gt;inflations may not be all in favor of the business such high prices&lt;br /&gt;may prove to be a temporary phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4. If the conditions of runway inflation the real value of bonds and&lt;br /&gt;cash would be almost wiped out as happened after breakup of USSR with&lt;br /&gt;inflation crossing 1000% per year.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;CONSLUSION&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A general conclusion can be derived that equities, bought at fair&lt;br /&gt;prices, are the best bet when you expect higher inflation. If the&lt;br /&gt;inflation has already moved high the low bond prices may be more&lt;br /&gt;attractive choice as inflated stock prices. The investor is faced&lt;br /&gt;with a difficult choice of slow erosion of real value through&lt;br /&gt;investment in debt on one hand and prospect of decline in asset&lt;br /&gt;prices from current highs on the other. Like all another financial&lt;br /&gt;situations, he need deal inflationary conditions with caution and he&lt;br /&gt;should base his actions on his knowledge and understanding of current&lt;br /&gt;situation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Dec 13,2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1119"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1119&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646582422387122?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646582422387122/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646582422387122' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646582422387122'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646582422387122'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/effects-of-inflation-on-asset.html' title='Effects of inflation on asset allocation'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646560679793464</id><published>2006-04-30T23:38:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:40:06.896-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Long term investing</title><content type='html'>So often you would read my messages about investing for long term.&lt;br /&gt;Today when I was watching CNBC I got an interesting interpretation of&lt;br /&gt;long term. A small investor said he invests only for long term. in&lt;br /&gt;further questions he said that he invests with 1 year time frame in&lt;br /&gt;mind. This interpretation of long term surprised me and I thoughts&lt;br /&gt;let's clarify what I mean by long term so that the members of this&lt;br /&gt;group are not confused about it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Long term as I take it, is a time period which is required to take&lt;br /&gt;business from the present state to a very different state in term of&lt;br /&gt;progress of business. In case of new businesses its the gestation&lt;br /&gt;period for the business where the reaches its normal level of&lt;br /&gt;profitability on the initial investment.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the corporate world the period may differ based on the&lt;br /&gt;characteristics of the industry but the lowest time frame that can be&lt;br /&gt;characterized as long term is 5 years.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For a typical business you can say 4 or more years as long term, 2-3&lt;br /&gt;years as medium term and anything less than 2 years as short term. I&lt;br /&gt;don't think that capital invested for less than an year timeframe in&lt;br /&gt;mind falls under investment category and back that tax department for&lt;br /&gt;taxing it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I have delved upon the advantages of long term approach in countless&lt;br /&gt;messages in last 3 years. Out portfolio LWB Special is an example of&lt;br /&gt;what long term investing means. Hence in this message I would focus&lt;br /&gt;on the cases where long term investing can go wrong.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When you invest for long term, the future of your invested capital&lt;br /&gt;and retuns is tied up with the success of business. In short term you&lt;br /&gt;can play around with undervalued stocks which revert to their mean&lt;br /&gt;valuations and make money. However in long term the only determining&lt;br /&gt;factor is the cash flows generated by the business during this period&lt;br /&gt;and the potential at the fag end of your investing time frame.&lt;br /&gt;Please note the second part clearly. Even though your business is&lt;br /&gt;successful during the 5 years when you are holding the stocks but&lt;br /&gt;when you need money the business in a temporary down phase, the&lt;br /&gt;markets may not give you true price of the business. This is because&lt;br /&gt;the investment communities, including high profile analysts are so&lt;br /&gt;fascinated with quarterly numbers, the immediate past counts heavily&lt;br /&gt;on stock prices. That leads us to the first implication.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 1: When you invest for long term you have to manage your&lt;br /&gt;investment and liquidity needs in such a way that you are never&lt;br /&gt;forced to exit at unattractive prices under any circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let's move on to the other aspect implied in the fact that the&lt;br /&gt;success of your investment depends on success of your business. All&lt;br /&gt;the businesses operate under inevitable economic laws. Among these&lt;br /&gt;laws the one that can cause you greatest harm is law of diminishing&lt;br /&gt;returns. Let's assume that you invest in a business that is generated&lt;br /&gt;very high returns on capital. You pay a premium price to get a stake&lt;br /&gt;in the business (the price of the stock). In the long run such high&lt;br /&gt;returns attract competitors both the domestic and multinationals.&lt;br /&gt;When the total capital invested in the business grows the returns&lt;br /&gt;come down to more average levels. As an analogy you can see how your&lt;br /&gt;speed diminishes the number of cars on the road grow. Another&lt;br /&gt;important consequence is that your risk of accident increases.&lt;br /&gt;Your business may still be generating sufficient returns above the&lt;br /&gt;cost of capital, but the premium paid on such a business evaporates.&lt;br /&gt;In such a case the price paid by you may turn out to be too high to&lt;br /&gt;enable decent gains even when the business as such grows. There are&lt;br /&gt;other changes and associated laws which can affect the profitability&lt;br /&gt;of business including but not limited to, changes in interest rates,&lt;br /&gt;regulation, taxation, technology, consumer preferences, currency&lt;br /&gt;fluctuation, economic recession etc. This leads us to the second&lt;br /&gt;implication of long term investing.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 2: When you invest for long term you have to be aware&lt;br /&gt;that the superior business returns can degrade to more average&lt;br /&gt;levels. Hence before paying premium for such superior returns you&lt;br /&gt;have to ensure that these are sustainable over the investment&lt;br /&gt;timeframe. Conversely you can not reject the business yielding&lt;br /&gt;average returns without proper analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let's move on to prices that you pay for the stake. As Buffett says&lt;br /&gt;the investors drive using rear view mirror. When they analyze the&lt;br /&gt;valuation of the stock they pay high importance to the immediate past&lt;br /&gt;last 4 quarters. They use the past opportunistically to find a growth&lt;br /&gt;rate for last 5 years and project it to next 10 years. The growth in&lt;br /&gt;long term is at mercy of another empirical law. The law of reversion&lt;br /&gt;to means. Most economic variables in a stable economic system revert&lt;br /&gt;to their mean values. It is not possible for a company to grow at&lt;br /&gt;rates higher than industry average for a long period. The same goes&lt;br /&gt;for growth of a specific industry relative to the country's growth.&lt;br /&gt;The investors and analysts try to sum up the situation in over&lt;br /&gt;simplified parameters like P/E, RONW without analyzing properly the&lt;br /&gt;quality and sustainability of the same. The newer terms like PEG are&lt;br /&gt;what I term as mathematically flawed because PEG assumes linear&lt;br /&gt;relationship between a growth rate and P/E attributable to that&lt;br /&gt;growth. This leads us to the next implication.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 3: The earnings and other profitability parameters of the&lt;br /&gt;businesses are mean reverting. Over a long term a company with high&lt;br /&gt;returns can return to average returns. A company with high growth can&lt;br /&gt;return to a low growth or negative growth. Hence the valuations for&lt;br /&gt;long term investments can not be based on variable of immediate past.&lt;br /&gt;Averages of last 5 years may be better indicator then the current&lt;br /&gt;earnings. The analytical ratios derived without proper context can do&lt;br /&gt;you more harm then anything else.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Though the list of implication can go on and on, I would summarize&lt;br /&gt;the message with the last but important point. As Graham said the&lt;br /&gt;promoters and managements are closer to the assets than the&lt;br /&gt;investors. There is a huge variety of ways, including some perfectly&lt;br /&gt;legal ways, in which promoters and managements can serve their own&lt;br /&gt;interest rather than the interest of small investors. If you invest&lt;br /&gt;for long term with a company managed by crooks and promoted by&lt;br /&gt;unethical promoters, your assets would be siphoned off. Its like&lt;br /&gt;keeping a valuable locker room unlocked for too long. The&lt;br /&gt;preferential allotments when the prices are low, stocks options, huge&lt;br /&gt;salaries for directors, acquisitions of other companies owned by&lt;br /&gt;promoters at high prices are some of the legal ways which can lead to&lt;br /&gt;wiping out the networth accumulated over a long time period. This&lt;br /&gt;leads us to the next implication of this message.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Implication 4: A typical business returns only a part of earnings as&lt;br /&gt;dividends. The rest of the profits are reinvested in the business. If&lt;br /&gt;the promoters or management follows unethical practices the investors&lt;br /&gt;can not count upon the reinvested earnings as a return on their&lt;br /&gt;investment. This implies that dividends are very important aspect&lt;br /&gt;contrary to the currently popular belief that growing businesses&lt;br /&gt;should not pay high dividends. It also means that the risk of assets&lt;br /&gt;being siphoned off is not only high but incalculable and even&lt;br /&gt;astronomically high returns can not compensate for this risk. Hence&lt;br /&gt;the long term investments should be made only in those companies&lt;br /&gt;which demonstrate high degree of accountability to general investors&lt;br /&gt;and have high standards of corporate governance.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would like to summarize the message with saying that the long term&lt;br /&gt;investment by itself does not guarantee high returns, even though&lt;br /&gt;it's the best investment strategy available to investors. If you are&lt;br /&gt;investing for long term you should make a very careful selection of&lt;br /&gt;your investments and pay a price only after completing an all&lt;br /&gt;encompassing analysis of the characteristics of business.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Dec 2, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1085"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1085&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646560679793464?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646560679793464/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646560679793464' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646560679793464'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646560679793464'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/long-term-investing.html' title='Long term investing'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646548242032855</id><published>2006-04-30T23:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:38:02.423-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Risk premium on housing loans</title><content type='html'>I want to draw attention of the equity analysts in the group to a&lt;br /&gt;puzzling proximity in the housing lone rates and rates on govt. bonds.&lt;br /&gt;As you all know the govt. bond are the safest form of fixed income&lt;br /&gt;instruments and housing loans suffer from the risk of defaults.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Here follows a comparison of Govt bond rates and housing loan rates:&lt;br /&gt;Loan rates for tenure to 5 years : 8.50%&lt;br /&gt;5 year govt. bond rate : 6.81%&lt;br /&gt;Risk premium charged : 1.69%&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Loan rates for tenure to 5-15 years : 9.00%&lt;br /&gt;15 year govt. bond rate : 7.52%&lt;br /&gt;Risk premium charged : 1.48%&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Loan rates for tenure to 15-20 years : 9.25%&lt;br /&gt;5 year govt. bond rate : 7.80%&lt;br /&gt;Risk premium charged : 1.45%&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Source:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.bseindia.com/qresann/news.asp?newsid=%7BD1D6832D-31FA-43E4-B686-29FB084%5C"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.bseindia.com/qresann/news.asp?newsid=%7BD1D6832D-31FA-43E4-B686-29FB084%5CC7CF0%7D"&gt;http://www.bseindia.com/qresann/news.asp?newsid={D1D6832D-31FA-43E4-B686-29FB084\C7CF0}&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The risk premium ranges from 1.45% to 1.69%. Especially in short term&lt;br /&gt;loans the figure seems low. For instance if 7.5% of the housing loans&lt;br /&gt;default the banks/housing finance companies(HFCs) would get returns&lt;br /&gt;less than the govt bonds. Any further rise in interest rates will&lt;br /&gt;change the equation further.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Here I have not taken into account the selling and administrative&lt;br /&gt;expenses incurred by banks on selling these loan products.It would be&lt;br /&gt;interesting to gather data on whether the banks/HFCs are able to get&lt;br /&gt;the promotion /selling/ administration expenses from the upfront fee&lt;br /&gt;they charge apart from the interest. In personal loans it's quite&lt;br /&gt;common to charge 2% upfront and I'm unable to get data about the&lt;br /&gt;upfront fees in housing loans.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thus every thing depends on what is the level of risk in housing loan.&lt;br /&gt;The risk in any fixed income security is covered in 2 ways.&lt;br /&gt;1) By securing loans with assets. This means that a bank/HFC should&lt;br /&gt;give a loan worth less than the value of property. Considering high&lt;br /&gt;prices of real estate the banks should keep adequate margin of safety&lt;br /&gt;2) The income of the person purchasing loan product: The person&lt;br /&gt;availing the loan should have an income sufficient to meet his&lt;br /&gt;interest payments. In case of corporate customers income to interest&lt;br /&gt;ratio (interest cover) of less than 3 is considered risky. In case of&lt;br /&gt;individuals I thing that the interest coverage should be more than 5.&lt;br /&gt;Another point to consider here is that the earning of a&lt;br /&gt;company is net of all costs where the income of a person is gross.&lt;br /&gt;While giving loans only the income is counted and any accounting of&lt;br /&gt;expenses, though logical, is impractical.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On both these counts, I think, banks/HFCs are throwing caution to the&lt;br /&gt;wind. In a competitive market where the employees have to meet their&lt;br /&gt;targets such a result is not unnatural. I have read in the papers that&lt;br /&gt;the banks are now giving loans up to 80-90% of the value of property.&lt;br /&gt;They are giving loans to persons who have income barely twice the&lt;br /&gt;interest payment.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;RBI has also cautioned the banks in a measured way. The Monetary&lt;br /&gt;policy contained the following statements&lt;br /&gt;"The fast growing housing and consumer credit sectors also represent&lt;br /&gt;some degree of higher penetration, but the quality of lending needs to&lt;br /&gt;be ensured".... It is observed in the recent past that the growth of&lt;br /&gt;housing and consumer credit has been very strong. As a temporary&lt;br /&gt;counter cyclical measure, it is proposed to put in place, risk&lt;br /&gt;containment measures and increase the risk weight from 50 per cent to&lt;br /&gt;75 per cent in the case of housing loans and from 100 per cent to 125&lt;br /&gt;per cent in the case of consumer credit including personal loans and&lt;br /&gt;credit cards"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If such concerns are really valid and remain unaddressed, the retail&lt;br /&gt;credit boom may well leave banks with similar amount of NPAs which&lt;br /&gt;they accumulated on industrial credit boom in 90's.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 27, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1073"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1073&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646548242032855?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646548242032855/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646548242032855' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646548242032855'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646548242032855'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/risk-premium-on-housing-loans.html' title='Risk premium on housing loans'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646532532517625</id><published>2006-04-30T23:34:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:35:25.326-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Technical Analysis</title><content type='html'>I will admit that there was a time when I was chart gazer&lt;br /&gt;too(1996-98). I never made money by it but I was so much interested&lt;br /&gt;that I wrote an AI software called Autotrade. The hypothesis was that&lt;br /&gt;if a technical trader can make money an optimzed software program can&lt;br /&gt;make far more money due to quicker decisions. I set out to design this&lt;br /&gt;money making machine. That software had 30 technical analysis signals&lt;br /&gt;which used to act as Fund Managers and each had his weight in combined&lt;br /&gt;decision. There was a controller who will change the weightage of the&lt;br /&gt;signal based on past performance(there were promotions, demotions and&lt;br /&gt;firings of fund manager!). I ran that program on the Sensex data for&lt;br /&gt;last 10 years. The results were interesting.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The signals made huge money when there decisions were right and lost a&lt;br /&gt;little bit on false signals. But overall the false signals far&lt;br /&gt;outnumbered the right signals. The net result was that with the&lt;br /&gt;highest level of optimization I was able to reach 8% gain per annum&lt;br /&gt;level before brokerage. I was good enough for a financially dumb&lt;br /&gt;program but I was not inclusing brokerage. As soon as I added&lt;br /&gt;brokerage the returns were down to -4.78%.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I spent countless nights to improve the results. I separated leading&lt;br /&gt;indicators from lagging indicator but there was simply no way to beat&lt;br /&gt;the odds stacked against the technical trading.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I concluded the excercise by proving the anti thesis.&lt;br /&gt;IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE MONEY FROM TECHNICAL ANALYSIS IN LONG RUN.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Those who still think that they can make money through charts can&lt;br /&gt;purchase this software from me. It will cost you $11.5 in cash and all&lt;br /&gt;your investment money in long run.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 25,2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1067"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1067&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646532532517625?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646532532517625/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646532532517625' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646532532517625'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646532532517625'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/technical-analysis.html' title='Technical Analysis'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646523040602663</id><published>2006-04-30T23:32:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:33:50.406-07:00</updated><title type='text'>(Investing?) in Real Estate</title><content type='html'>Personally, I do not consider real estate as an avenue for investment. It can&lt;br /&gt;be satisfy your consumption needs or speculative needs but not&lt;br /&gt;investment appetite.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Apart from the list of reason you have given here are some more.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. It is impossible to judge the present value and expected growth of&lt;br /&gt;real estate using any sort of analysis. There is simply no information&lt;br /&gt;available to appraise the worth of a piece of real estate.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. There is no information available to evaluate the risks associated&lt;br /&gt;with the real estate investment. The legal problems as you mentioned&lt;br /&gt;pose an incalculable risk. Hence it is not possible to use any&lt;br /&gt;benchmark to ascertain margin of safety.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. I perfectly agree that the returns are over hyped. People tell me&lt;br /&gt;so often that the land prices in this or that locality have became 5&lt;br /&gt;times in 2 years. Well..I tell them that I can give names of hundreds&lt;br /&gt;of stocks which have become 5 times. What does it prove? The very fact&lt;br /&gt;that the land prices have gone up may cause further gains to be&lt;br /&gt;limited. People think that the land prices will go up and up because&lt;br /&gt;there is limited supply and increasing demand. The same argument&lt;br /&gt;applies to oil, minerals or any other limited resource.&lt;br /&gt;For those who think that the real estate never goes down&lt;br /&gt;you can compare the rates in Connaught place, one of the prime&lt;br /&gt;locations in delhi, with the rates prevailing in 1995-96. The rates&lt;br /&gt;fell have fallen 40% when the corporate started moving out to Noida&lt;br /&gt;and Gurgaon.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As an avenue for consumption real estate does provide significant&lt;br /&gt;advantage, specially in metro's. You can save a lot of taxes and high&lt;br /&gt;rents in housing properties. The other reason is that the real estate&lt;br /&gt;and housing is an asset with zero or negative depreciation. No other&lt;br /&gt;asset appreciate in value even while you use it. If you buy a house&lt;br /&gt;and are living in it the hazards of illegal occupations are minimal.&lt;br /&gt;Even here you got to ensure that you don't pay artificially high&lt;br /&gt;prices based on expected further growth and buy clear land titles and&lt;br /&gt;stay away from controversial properties.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 16, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1055"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1055&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646523040602663?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646523040602663/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646523040602663' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646523040602663'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646523040602663'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/investing-in-real-estate.html' title='(Investing?) in Real Estate'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646503373019109</id><published>2006-04-30T23:29:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:30:33.733-07:00</updated><title type='text'>When to Sell</title><content type='html'>High price or high P/E should not be the only criteria for selling.&lt;br /&gt;If you recollect 1 year ago Sterlite, Mahindra , ABB were selling at&lt;br /&gt;P/E of above 40. We decided to stay and the earnings have increased&lt;br /&gt;to such an extent that the same companies are quoting at P/E of less&lt;br /&gt;than 12 even though the prices have advanced since then. The only&lt;br /&gt;stock I sold in last 4 years was Bharti tele at 45 booking 50% gain&lt;br /&gt;and you know what happened next.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I have the following rules for selling overvalued holdings though I&lt;br /&gt;do override them in case to case basis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. When the future prospects of the company do not guareentee that&lt;br /&gt;the p/e would be reduced to a more sensible figure(&lt; 15).&lt;br /&gt;2. When the prices are quoting at more than 30 times highest ever&lt;br /&gt;earning of the company.&lt;br /&gt;3. When the company is loosing its conpititive position which was&lt;br /&gt;responsible for premium over general market.&lt;br /&gt;4. When the company management/pronmotors shows any signs of&lt;br /&gt;dishonest behavior in reporting financial results, in transactions&lt;br /&gt;(preferential allotment, low priced ESOPs).&lt;br /&gt;5. When the general economic scenario warrents lower multiples. In&lt;br /&gt;this category would come rising long term interest rates, increase in&lt;br /&gt;general tax rates.&lt;br /&gt;6. When the industry is about to go through disruptive changess like&lt;br /&gt;opening of markets in case of protected monopoly companies, increase&lt;br /&gt;in taxes, restrictive regulation in industries like&lt;br /&gt;tobaccco,breweries.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In nutshell there are very few quantitaive criteria for selling and&lt;br /&gt;its quite natural to make mistakes. However my guidelines in buying&lt;br /&gt;and selling have a major difference.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In buying I'm conservative. That means I would rather miss an&lt;br /&gt;opportunity for making gains if my analysis is either incomplete or&lt;br /&gt;inconclusive.&lt;br /&gt;In selling I'm optimistic. I would rather hold the stock and suffer a&lt;br /&gt;fall if my analysis is either incomplete or inconclusive.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To sum up, I prefer inaction if action is not warrented by the facts&lt;br /&gt;and analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 8, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1043"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1043&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646503373019109?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646503373019109/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646503373019109' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646503373019109'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646503373019109'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/when-to-sell.html' title='When to Sell'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646496618454371</id><published>2006-04-30T23:28:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:29:26.186-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Book Review: How To Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest like Warren Buffett</title><content type='html'>Having read free e-text of this book by Lawrence A. Cunningham, I now&lt;br /&gt;feel that the author did deserve the royalty for it and would&lt;br /&gt;recommend that you buy a print. I did upload it to the files/books&lt;br /&gt;section and if you don't have any moralistic pretensions you can read&lt;br /&gt;it from there.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Coming back to the business(review!), I would say that the book is&lt;br /&gt;well written. Lawrence A. Cunningham is known for his compilation of&lt;br /&gt;Buffett's letters in form of the book "The Essays of Warren Buffett :&lt;br /&gt;Lessons for Corporate America"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;He makes no bones about his expertise as an investment guru. He writes&lt;br /&gt;"I condense these ideas and insights in the spirit of a teacher and&lt;br /&gt;professor, not an investment adviser". However as you read the book&lt;br /&gt;you would notice that he himself has become a more trustworthy advisor&lt;br /&gt;than most wall street high flyers. Knowledge is contagious!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To the person who has never read Graham and Buffett, the prospects of&lt;br /&gt;hitting two birds with one arrow may seem exciting. This book, however&lt;br /&gt;does not contain much about the nuances of the investment philosophies&lt;br /&gt;of these legendary investors. It does contain snippets and intersting&lt;br /&gt;examples.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The value proposition of the book comes from very good exposition on&lt;br /&gt;the efficient market theory. He debunks this theory, staple diet of&lt;br /&gt;business graduates, in a systematic manner. He raises valid&lt;br /&gt;questionmaks on other theories, like Capital Asset pricing model and&lt;br /&gt;Mordern portfolio theories, which again make most of the texts of MBA&lt;br /&gt;courses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The other exciting parts are the chaptors on corporate governance. The&lt;br /&gt;book contains examples from real life describing the policies of good&lt;br /&gt;companies and showing the loop holes exploited by the bad managers.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Overall the book is exciting, relevant to the present context and an&lt;br /&gt;eye opener in some chaptors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Oct 23, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1019"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/1019&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646496618454371?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646496618454371/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646496618454371' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646496618454371'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646496618454371'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/book-review-how-to-think-like-benjamin.html' title='Book Review: How To Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest like Warren Buffett'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646488874611298</id><published>2006-04-30T23:26:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:28:08.746-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Buffett's coin-flipping contest</title><content type='html'>Investing is not the field for those who do&lt;br /&gt;not have sufficient expertise to evaluate the company's prospects.&lt;br /&gt;For the people who are learning the tricks of the trade, it is better&lt;br /&gt;that they put their money in experienced hands.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However one should note that the historical performance may not be&lt;br /&gt;the indicator of future performance. Even if the fund managers&lt;br /&gt;invest randomly you would find top 10 funds giving superb returns.&lt;br /&gt;Warren Buffett had explained this phenomenon in a characteristic&lt;br /&gt;humor. I'm putting this excerpts here(full text in files/articles&lt;br /&gt;section)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;**THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE by Warren E. Buffett**&lt;br /&gt;"I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let's&lt;br /&gt;assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask&lt;br /&gt;them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise,&lt;br /&gt;and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they&lt;br /&gt;win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop&lt;br /&gt;out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous&lt;br /&gt;winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there&lt;br /&gt;will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have&lt;br /&gt;correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little&lt;br /&gt;over $1,000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about&lt;br /&gt;this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but&lt;br /&gt;at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive&lt;br /&gt;members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what&lt;br /&gt;marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from&lt;br /&gt;the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have&lt;br /&gt;successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by&lt;br /&gt;this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1&lt;br /&gt;million. $225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have&lt;br /&gt;been won.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably&lt;br /&gt;write books on "How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days&lt;br /&gt;Working Thirty Seconds a Morning." Worse yet, they'll probably start&lt;br /&gt;jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-&lt;br /&gt;flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, " If it can't be&lt;br /&gt;done, why are there 215 of us?"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough&lt;br /&gt;to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a&lt;br /&gt;similar exercise, the results would be much the same - 215&lt;br /&gt;egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips"&lt;br /&gt;*********************************************************************&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The bottom line is that the new investors are still better off with&lt;br /&gt;mutual funds but they should not blindly assume that past&lt;br /&gt;performances would continue.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:Oct 7, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/972"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/972&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646488874611298?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646488874611298/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646488874611298' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646488874611298'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646488874611298'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/buffetts-coin-flipping-contest.html' title='Buffett&apos;s coin-flipping contest'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646458867493444</id><published>2006-04-30T23:22:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:23:08.676-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Book Review: Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits</title><content type='html'>Around 4 years ago, while reading about investment philosophy of&lt;br /&gt;Buffett, I chanced upon a quote from him saying that his style was 85%&lt;br /&gt;Graham and 15% Fisher. I had been a avid reader of Graham by then but&lt;br /&gt;I was hearing about Fisher for the first time. Couple of searches&lt;br /&gt;later I got the details about this book called 'Common Stocks and&lt;br /&gt;Uncommon Profits'. The book came highly recommended by famous investors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When I read it I wasn't sure whether what Fisher said was at all&lt;br /&gt;possible. He talks about the growth stocks where you buy and hold for&lt;br /&gt;years seeing them grow 10 time..20 times. By that time I was into&lt;br /&gt;buying undervalued companies at low price and selling them as soon as&lt;br /&gt;they reverted to normal valuations. I liked his approach of analyzing&lt;br /&gt;the company's business by meeting with customers, employees ,&lt;br /&gt;suppliers rather than focusing on vague and volatile numbers from&lt;br /&gt;annual reports. But I wasn't sure whether a individual investor can&lt;br /&gt;achieve this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On the second reading 4 year later, I found that my experience of last&lt;br /&gt;4 years really back what Fisher had to say. I had realized that&lt;br /&gt;investing in good businesses and holding for long term is a better&lt;br /&gt;approach than buying stocks of troubled companies at dirt cheap&lt;br /&gt;prices. The main reason for this change was that my earlier focus on&lt;br /&gt;accounting numbers like EPS, P/E, ROE was proved wrong too many times.&lt;br /&gt;I had bought many stocks just because their financials looked great&lt;br /&gt;without bothering to know more about the company. The results of these&lt;br /&gt;decisions were disastorous. On the other hand many of my investments&lt;br /&gt;grew to 15 to 20 times their original value. When I did a detailed&lt;br /&gt;study then I realized that al the successful decisions were those&lt;br /&gt;where I had bought good businesses at attractive prices. I realized&lt;br /&gt;that a good business ensures that the financials will look attractive&lt;br /&gt;in long run but the financial figures which look attractive on first&lt;br /&gt;glance do imply a good business.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would rate this book the second most useful for the investors(the&lt;br /&gt;first of course is 'Intelligent Investor' by Graham). The book&lt;br /&gt;contains lot of useful tips about making your own investment strategy.&lt;br /&gt;It exposes many myths small investors generally hold. It reminds the&lt;br /&gt;investors that they are part owners of a business not a buyer of&lt;br /&gt;lottery tickets. If one thinks that by number crunching he can know&lt;br /&gt;about the characteristics and prospects of business, this book will&lt;br /&gt;bring him closer to the hard reality.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Overall this book provides a very good reading with interesting real&lt;br /&gt;life examples. Being free of investment jargons this book is easily&lt;br /&gt;digestible to those who are new comers to the field of investing. I&lt;br /&gt;recommend this book to all the investors.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646458867493444?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646458867493444/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646458867493444' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646458867493444'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646458867493444'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/book-review-common-stocks-and-uncommon.html' title='Book Review: Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646425725802832</id><published>2006-04-30T23:15:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:17:37.260-07:00</updated><title type='text'>When to Buy</title><content type='html'>Making a decision on purchase of a stock, which you have singled out&lt;br /&gt;for investment based on your research, presents difficulties for most&lt;br /&gt;investors. More often than not people try to time their purchases.&lt;br /&gt;They want to buy the stock but hesitate to pay the current price. The&lt;br /&gt;market analysts of CNBC add even more confusion by claiming that the&lt;br /&gt;stock has gone too high and buy at correction.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My answer to the question is an emphatic NO. Market timing may have&lt;br /&gt;worked in their case but it never worked in my 10 year investing&lt;br /&gt;career. In the investment philosophy which I have developed, this&lt;br /&gt;decision is very simple for me. When I evaluate the prospects of the&lt;br /&gt;company I generally decide a price band for purchase, based on my&lt;br /&gt;valuation. Please understand that the intrinsic value is not a pointed&lt;br /&gt;value. Suppose a company has chances of 10-25% growth in next 10 years&lt;br /&gt;with different probabilities. The intrinsic value calculated based on&lt;br /&gt;10% growth will be vastly different from the once at 20% growth. So&lt;br /&gt;all we can calculate is a price band where each point has associated&lt;br /&gt;probabilities.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thus when there are no specific values why do investors decide that&lt;br /&gt;they will buy only when the stock falls 20% from current value. Most&lt;br /&gt;people do this because they have no knowledge of valuation and they&lt;br /&gt;think that market is efficiently pricing the stock. They think that if&lt;br /&gt;the current price is correct and they are able to buy at 20% below&lt;br /&gt;this they would make gains.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So what is the alternative? I can tell once which I follow (quite&lt;br /&gt;successfully). I decide at which price band I'm comfortable and start&lt;br /&gt;buying at that. I make periodic investments subsequently based on&lt;br /&gt;renewed information about the company. For instance 4 years ago my&lt;br /&gt;research showed that M&amp;M is a company worthy of investment. Based on&lt;br /&gt;different growth estimates the valuations suggested a price band of&lt;br /&gt;400-600. I made the first investment of only Rs 15000 at Rs. 315. In&lt;br /&gt;next 3 years I made 25 additional investments in M&amp;amp;M whenever it fell.&lt;br /&gt;The last and the biggest investment I made was at Rs 52. My average&lt;br /&gt;worked out to Rs 87 and current price of Rs 440 is almost 5 times&lt;br /&gt;high. You could argue that if I had made all the investment at Rs 52&lt;br /&gt;my gains would have been higher but these things work only in the&lt;br /&gt;hindsight. You can never predict movement of stock prices in short&lt;br /&gt;term and I know my limitations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Please note here that the original investment at Rs 325 too has&lt;br /&gt;provided me a gain of 40%. So I think that the best way is to start&lt;br /&gt;with small investment and increase it as the .....Price falls....&lt;br /&gt;No. As you get to know more about he company and are more comfortable&lt;br /&gt;about its value in relation to current price.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Price in itself does not matter. In J&amp;K bank I made similar series of&lt;br /&gt;investments starting at Rs. 26 and continuing till Rs. 120 as the bank&lt;br /&gt;grew in strength and profits.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Here is the bottom line. Start with small investment. Get to know more&lt;br /&gt;about the company. Do a periodic review. Every time the decision has&lt;br /&gt;to be made considering the current price in relation to its current&lt;br /&gt;prospects.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In case of M&amp;amp;M the prospects worsened(with tractor market degrowth)&lt;br /&gt;but price fell even more sharply. That's why I invested more. In case&lt;br /&gt;of J&amp;K bank the price rose by 200% but the bank business and its value&lt;br /&gt;in the eyes of the financial community grew more. So I made more&lt;br /&gt;purchases at prices twice high as the initial one.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You can develop your own investment styles and take more risk by&lt;br /&gt;commiting all your funds at once if you are dead sure about your&lt;br /&gt;valuation. In my case though I'm dead sure about my valuation I'm&lt;br /&gt;never sure about valuation of Mr. Market&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Sep 5, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/877"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/877&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646425725802832?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646425725802832/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646425725802832' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646425725802832'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646425725802832'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/when-to-buy.html' title='When to Buy'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646410775201723</id><published>2006-04-30T23:13:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:15:07.753-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Valuation of firms with high debt</title><content type='html'>In the cases where the debt is high relative to the size of operation&lt;br /&gt;the proper method of valuation is Firm Valuation rather than Equity&lt;br /&gt;valuation. In Firm valuation the total value of enterpise i.e. debt +&lt;br /&gt;equity, is calculated based on earnings before interest. This value&lt;br /&gt;can give equity valuation if you subtract the debt.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would like to explain this using valuation of MALCO where I did a&lt;br /&gt;mistake by using Equity Valuation method.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you use Equity Valuation you would find that MALCO was quoting at&lt;br /&gt;Rs 142 which means market cap of Rs. 320 Crs. MALCO had net profit of&lt;br /&gt;Rs. 37.22 crs. on standalone basis. If you consolidate the profits of&lt;br /&gt;its 7.18% stake in Sterlite it would have consolidate profit of around&lt;br /&gt;65 crs. That's why I considered MALCO an undervalued stock and&lt;br /&gt;ecommended a Buy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you do Firm Valuation then you would find that MALCO is not that&lt;br /&gt;attractive afterall. This is because it has huge debt of 434 Crs. at&lt;br /&gt;Debt/Equity ratio of 4.27.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In such cases the Firm valuation is better approach than Equity&lt;br /&gt;Valuation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At price of Rs 142&lt;br /&gt;Equity Value = 320 Crs&lt;br /&gt;Debt(06/2003)= 434 Crs.&lt;br /&gt;Enterprise Value = Equity Value + Debt = 754 Crs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you remove the value of 7.18% Sterlite stake 262 Crs(@515) the&lt;br /&gt;enterprise value of the MALCO core operations is still Rs 492 Crs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;FCFF(free cash flow to firm) =&lt;br /&gt;EBIT (1-t) - (Cap Ex - Depreciation) - Change in Working Capital&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Under no growth situation, assuming that the depreciation cancels out&lt;br /&gt;Cap Expenditure and no changes to working capital the free cash flow&lt;br /&gt;to firm for MALCO would be&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EBIT 62.35&lt;br /&gt;Tax rate = 15.23%&lt;br /&gt;FCFF = 62.35*(1-0.15) = 52.84 Crs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At Rs 142 the market was valuing the enterprise value of MALCO core&lt;br /&gt;operations at Rs 492 Crs. Which means a EV/FCFF multiple of 9.30 which&lt;br /&gt;is not underpriced for a commodity company.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The only catch is that I have used the debt value for the year 2003.&lt;br /&gt;The debt must have come down as the interest charges for year 2004&lt;br /&gt;were 8.99 Crs., compared to 16.06 Crs. Even that value will make it a&lt;br /&gt;definite SELL at RS. 162.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;More on Firm valuation&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/fcff.html"&gt;http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/fcff.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; On choosing the right model&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/basics.html"&gt;http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/lectures/basics.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Sep 13 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/894"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/894&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646410775201723?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646410775201723/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646410775201723' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646410775201723'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646410775201723'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/valuation-of-firms-with-high-debt.html' title='Valuation of firms with high debt'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646385358611177</id><published>2006-04-30T23:09:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:10:53.586-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Dividend yields that beat FDs</title><content type='html'>Very few of the investors realize the immense potential of regular&lt;br /&gt;income from equity investments. If you choose your investments&lt;br /&gt;carefully, it is not only possible to get some regular income from&lt;br /&gt;investments but the dividends can beat the returns from fixed deposits.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let me explain the essentials of the approach to achieve this result.&lt;br /&gt;When an investor invests for the long term he would mostly focus on&lt;br /&gt;the long term capital appreciation rather than the current income.&lt;br /&gt;Also any good company will generally find a way to reinvest the&lt;br /&gt;profits in the core business and distribute only 20-30% of profits to&lt;br /&gt;the shareholders which may not amount to a good yield relative to FDs.&lt;br /&gt;For this reason it is difficult to find good companies at fair prices&lt;br /&gt;to get a good dividend yield while provide chance of capital&lt;br /&gt;appreciation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You see a real example open the LWB Special portfolio in a new window&lt;br /&gt;by clicking link 'LWB Special Portfolio' in the home page. In the&lt;br /&gt;second last column you would notice that dividend yields of the&lt;br /&gt;companies at current market price are in the region of 2 to 3%, with&lt;br /&gt;the average at 2.42%. So an investor in these stocks would be getting&lt;br /&gt;2 to 3% dividend yield.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But those investors who bought the stocks when the model portfolio was&lt;br /&gt;started are getting a dividend yield ranging from 2 to 16%. If you&lt;br /&gt;take the average you would be surprised to know that these investors&lt;br /&gt;(myself included) are earning 6.3% dividend yield on their original&lt;br /&gt;investment. So these investors not only enjoy 160% gains in 2.7 years,&lt;br /&gt;they are getting 6.3% returns on investment which is better than a&lt;br /&gt;fixed deposit with a bank.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This example brings us to the main features of a portfolio with a view&lt;br /&gt;to high income.&lt;br /&gt;1. The portfolio should not be made just by viewing current dividend&lt;br /&gt;yields. Many companies pay good dividends when sun shines but send no&lt;br /&gt;cheque when dark clouds loom over the horizon. A consistent dividend&lt;br /&gt;record plus the future growth would ensure that the dividends cheques&lt;br /&gt;keep coming to your doors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. If the companies keeps giving good dividends but the investment&lt;br /&gt;itself is under threat due to unrecoverable fall in prices the&lt;br /&gt;dividends are of no use. So the investment decision should still be&lt;br /&gt;based on capital preservation and growth.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. Most companies retain their dividend percentages after bonus&lt;br /&gt;issues. So the investors holding steadily growing can see higher&lt;br /&gt;dividend yields in the future.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4. The dividend payout by a company not only depends on the profits&lt;br /&gt;but also on the planned capital expenditure. A company which plans to&lt;br /&gt;spend on new plants etc will not be able to pay good dividends. That&lt;br /&gt;does not mean that this low dividend yield would continue forever.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;5. Although a fixed income deposit carries the return of the principal&lt;br /&gt;amount and a fixed yield in terms of money. This fixation is a double&lt;br /&gt;edged sword. Although the fixed income deposits provide lower risk in&lt;br /&gt;normal circumstances, these are subject to the threat of inflation. If&lt;br /&gt;the value of money goes down the real value of your principal and the&lt;br /&gt;real value of the interest go down. In a era of 6% inflation if you&lt;br /&gt;hold 5.5% FD, the main danger is not that you are loosing 0.5% in real&lt;br /&gt;terms but the fact that principal amount would be worth much less when&lt;br /&gt;you get it back at the end of the term.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Equity investments are relatively safer under inflationary scenarios&lt;br /&gt;because the value of assets and the prospective yields go up along&lt;br /&gt;with the prices.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;6. The interest on fixed deposits is subject to taxes (at source if&lt;br /&gt;&gt;2500) whereas the dividends are free in the hands of the investors.&lt;br /&gt;This means a dividend yield o 4.-4.5% is preferable over FD of 5.5-6%&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With these points in mind an enterprising investor can build a&lt;br /&gt;portfolio which can give a decent income after 2-3 years have passed&lt;br /&gt;while enjoying the benefits of capital gains.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Aug 27, 2004&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/857"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/857&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646385358611177?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646385358611177/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646385358611177' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646385358611177'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646385358611177'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/dividend-yields-that-beat-fds.html' title='Dividend yields that beat FDs'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646377188353941</id><published>2006-04-30T23:08:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:09:31.886-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Consolidated results Vs standalone results</title><content type='html'>Most investors find the complexities of valuation hard to deal with.&lt;br /&gt;The issue becomes even more complicated in case of companies which&lt;br /&gt;have large or numerous subsidiaries. As the financial results&lt;br /&gt;published in newspapers generally show the standalone results the&lt;br /&gt;investors often ignore the fact that it is the consolidated results&lt;br /&gt;not the standalone result which should be taken into account while&lt;br /&gt;valuing a company.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The subsidiaries can affect the financials in the following manner.&lt;br /&gt;1. If a company has a subsidiary than it has same % share in its&lt;br /&gt;assets as it has in the company's equity. The same holds good for&lt;br /&gt;liabilities as well although the liability is limited to the extent of&lt;br /&gt;parent company's exposure in the subsidiary.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Parent companies often give loans to the subsidiaries and to that&lt;br /&gt;extent they are exposed to the risk of default as a creditor.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. Parent companies get dividends by virtue of their stake and are&lt;br /&gt;liable to get rewards if the worth of the subsidiary grows.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is important to note here that the value of the investment in the&lt;br /&gt;subsidiaries is shown at book value in the balance sheet of the parent&lt;br /&gt;company. The actual value of the investment can be substantially&lt;br /&gt;different.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Also the income of the subsidiary is reflected only to the extent of&lt;br /&gt;dividend and if the dividend payout ratio is low then the income of&lt;br /&gt;the subsidiary is not correctly reflected.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Finally the business and the business prospects of the subsidiary can&lt;br /&gt;be quite different from the parent and the earnings attributed to the&lt;br /&gt;subsidiary can not be discounted at the same rate as the earnings of&lt;br /&gt;the parent.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So if you trying to evaluate the worth of a company then it would be a&lt;br /&gt;mistake to evaluate the financials of the parent on standalone basis.&lt;br /&gt;The investors of Enron discovered this bit too late when the company&lt;br /&gt;fooled not only general public but almost all the wall street analysts&lt;br /&gt;by showing good standalone results whereas all its subsidiaries were&lt;br /&gt;bleeding and had huge holes in their balance sheets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the Indian market this knowledge can be utilized by the value&lt;br /&gt;investors to generate high returns. The model portfolio LWB Special&lt;br /&gt;has 4 companies which have large and profitable subsidiaries.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mahindra &amp; Mahindra has a collection of many profit making&lt;br /&gt;subsidiaries which add a substantial amount of profits to parent. The&lt;br /&gt;most notable of these are MBT(57% stake), Mahindra Financial services,&lt;br /&gt;Club Mahindra. These companies add 77 Crs profits to the figure of&lt;br /&gt;348 Crs profit earned by Mahindra on standalone basis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HDFC has 25% stake in the HDFC Bank which is reelected in the&lt;br /&gt;valuation of HDFC.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sterlite holds 51% in BALCO and 64% in Hindustan Zinc. These companies&lt;br /&gt;add almost 400 Crs to the 198 Crs earned by Sterlite on standalone&lt;br /&gt;basis. While swapping of Sterlite with MALCO I have used the equation&lt;br /&gt;as MALCO holds 7.18% in Sterlite.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Micro Inks has a large subsidiary Micro Inks US which has turned&lt;br /&gt;around recently. The markets never cared for the losses it made during&lt;br /&gt;initial phases and nor did they account for the turnaround.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;All these companies were included in the LWB Special portfolios&lt;br /&gt;precisely because the market did not notice how much value was being&lt;br /&gt;created by the subsidiaries behind the scene. The superb results of&lt;br /&gt;these companies indicate how the value investor can utilize this&lt;br /&gt;information to make smart decision.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Indian accounting laws mandate that the companies publish this&lt;br /&gt;information in their annual report. This means that all this&lt;br /&gt;information is available to the investor with eye for hidden value.&lt;tt&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;Posted: Aug 21, 2004&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/847&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646377188353941?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646377188353941/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646377188353941' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646377188353941'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646377188353941'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/consolidated-results-vs-standalone.html' title='Consolidated results Vs standalone results'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646357093322260</id><published>2006-04-30T23:04:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:06:10.936-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Closed ended mutual funds</title><content type='html'>Closed ended mutual funds provide exciting opportunity to make&lt;br /&gt;handsome gains if you buy them at a discount.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A close-ended fund or scheme has a stipulated maturity period e.g. 5-7&lt;br /&gt;years. The fund is open for subscription only during a&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;specified period at the time of launch of the scheme. Investors can&lt;br /&gt;invest in the scheme at the time of the initial public&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;issue and thereafter they can buy or sell the units of the scheme on&lt;br /&gt;the stock exchanges where the units are listed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The market price of the listed closed ended fund generally trades at a&lt;br /&gt;discount. The discount depends 4 variables.&lt;br /&gt;1. Time left till redemption date : N years&lt;br /&gt;2. Interest rates : y% per ammum&lt;br /&gt;3. Expectated annualized returns : g% per ammum&lt;br /&gt;4. Expected Dividends : d&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For simplicity if you ignore variable 3 &amp; 4 then the market price can&lt;br /&gt;be calculated as follow.&lt;br /&gt;Assume Market Price is P&lt;br /&gt;NAV = P * [ (1+ 0.01* y) ^ N]&lt;br /&gt;^ stands of power&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As you know the NAV and price you can calculate what interest rate is&lt;br /&gt;built into the prices.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For instance NAV of Morgan Stanley Growth Fund(MSGF) is Rs. 18.81 and&lt;br /&gt;the market price is Rs. 13.85. As there are still 4.5&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;years left till date of redemption the prices are factoring in 7.04%&lt;br /&gt;interest rate. In simpler terms if you buy MSGF today&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;and its NAV remains same on Feb 2009 then you would still get 7.04%&lt;br /&gt;returns (- transaction costs ofcourse..)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However the factors which we ignored also play a significant role in&lt;br /&gt;pricing of closed ended mutual fund. For instance in&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2001-02 UTI crisis the UTIO mastershare was quoting at amazing 30%&lt;br /&gt;discount to NAV with only 2 years left to the&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;redemption date. I kept accumulating this fund throught the crisis&lt;br /&gt;days with significant transactions as given below.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;25-Jul-01 Buy 3000 9.65&lt;br /&gt;3-Oct-01 Buy 5000 6.6&lt;br /&gt;22-Apr-02 Buy 5000 9.35&lt;br /&gt;The average price comes to 8.36 and it now quotes at 17.25 after 2&lt;br /&gt;dividends.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At that time Sensex was quoting at 2700 -3000 range. As my&lt;br /&gt;expectations were that in 2 years the market will be quoting&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;higher than these levels I knew that I stand to gain much more than&lt;br /&gt;the discount at which I was buying. Let me explain this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Assume a fund is quoting at pice 'P' and has NAV as 'NAV' and it given&lt;br /&gt;returns of G% p.a. Let's assume the redemption date is&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;N years from today.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On redemption date NAV would be =&gt; NAV * [ (1 + 0.01* g) ^ N ]&lt;br /&gt;=&gt; NAV * (G^N) where G is (1 + 0.01* g)&lt;br /&gt;You bought the fund at price P.&lt;br /&gt;your returns is =&gt; [ NAV * (G^N) / P] ^ (1/N)&lt;br /&gt;Now NAV/Price is the discount.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;That means that your per annum returns gets boosted by a factor of&lt;br /&gt;[NAV/Price] ^ (1/N).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The mastershare mutual fund gained cumulative 61% but my returns were&lt;br /&gt;higher at 130% due to the discount of 30%. Please note&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;that the returns that I got were higher that simple addition of return&lt;br /&gt;of mutual fun and discount (i.e. 130 &gt; 61 + 30).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thus if you are bullish on the market in general buying a closed ended&lt;br /&gt;fund at discount gives extra returns and ensures lower losses in case&lt;br /&gt;the markets go down. However it is very important to check the&lt;br /&gt;portfolio of the fund, the management costs,exit loads and brokerages&lt;br /&gt;before buying a closed ended fund.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For more information on closed ended mutual funds click the following&lt;br /&gt;link:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Title : &lt;a href="http://linkindia.com/icefi/tutorial/index.htm"&gt;A Brief Guide to Closed-End Funds&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:  Aug 11, 2004&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/824&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646357093322260?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646357093322260/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646357093322260' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646357093322260'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646357093322260'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/closed-ended-mutual-funds.html' title='Closed ended mutual funds'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646343184525639</id><published>2006-04-30T23:02:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:03:51.846-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Buybacks</title><content type='html'>Buyback by a company definitely gives an indication that the&lt;br /&gt;management thinks the company's stock is undervalued. However it can&lt;br /&gt;not be sole criteria in deciding whether the stock is truly&lt;br /&gt;undervalued. This is because most management has high sounding notions&lt;br /&gt;about greatness of their companies and frequently go overboard in&lt;br /&gt;their estimations of worth of the company. Also the buyback means that&lt;br /&gt;the company does not have other avenues of deploying its cash in the&lt;br /&gt;operating business. Still buyback can enhance return on networth and&lt;br /&gt;EPS if the pricing of buyback is right.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There have been instances in india where the rogue managements have&lt;br /&gt;used buybacks from open market to jackup the prices of their stocks.&lt;br /&gt;One has to be careful to avoid such companies.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However the buyback defintly demands closer look on companies&lt;br /&gt;financials. My experience with buyback has been very interesting. In&lt;br /&gt;my case the buybacks were announced, most of the time, after I've&lt;br /&gt;taken position on a stock. It did substantiate my views. For instance&lt;br /&gt;I had when I had bough Sterlite it was quoting at half its book values&lt;br /&gt;and 4 time its profits. Then Sterlite announced buyback of 25% shares&lt;br /&gt;at 200. It later revised it to buyback 50% stock at 150. It was a very&lt;br /&gt;smart move on part of Anil Agrawal(promotor) and very dumb move for&lt;br /&gt;those who sold their stock to the company. The same stock now quotes&lt;br /&gt;at 514*2(bonus). There were other inatances like Reliance,Britannia,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So investors can use buyback as a trigger to start investigating more&lt;br /&gt;about the stock and only they would find that the company is realy&lt;br /&gt;underpriced the investment should be done.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Aug 7, 2004&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/817&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646343184525639?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646343184525639/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646343184525639' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646343184525639'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646343184525639'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/buybacks.html' title='Buybacks'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646321693306133</id><published>2006-04-30T22:57:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T23:00:16.943-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Investing Mistakes</title><content type='html'>&lt;tt&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;Mistakes teach you more than success, if you are willing to learn.&lt;br /&gt;When I started off in investing back in 94, still in&lt;br /&gt;college, I was very sure that if I make mistake now I would lose&lt;br /&gt;thousands of rupees but if I made mistakes 20 years later I would&lt;br /&gt;lose in crores because my total investment would be higher.&lt;br /&gt;There was one logical problem in this line of thinking. If I&lt;br /&gt;made mistake today and again the same mistake 20 years later, making&lt;br /&gt;mistakes won't help. So I started of documenting the mistakes,&lt;br /&gt;whenever it became apparent, in my diaries. I also gave unique error&lt;br /&gt;code to the mistake and wrote a 2 page description to each&lt;br /&gt;mistake.&lt;br /&gt;Some critical points in this documentation were the&lt;br /&gt;circumstances under which I took the wrong decision. Please note&lt;br /&gt;nobody takes wrong decisions. No decision is apparently wrong at the&lt;br /&gt;time when it is made. It's only the information we lack, or&lt;br /&gt;misinterpretation of current information that proves your decision&lt;br /&gt;wrong over time. You would also note that in hindsight it looks so&lt;br /&gt;clear but unless you consider the circumstances under which the&lt;br /&gt;mistakes were made, you are doomed to repeat the same mistakes.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The results have been good so far. As per my unaudited records I&lt;br /&gt;have made 87 UNIQUE mistakes and lost a total of Rs 4.5 lacs in&lt;br /&gt;these mistakes. (You know the kind of games mind plays while&lt;br /&gt;justifying the past decisions..I may not have documented all, surely&lt;br /&gt;I haven't accounted for mistakes involving opportunity loss).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Another thing that I've noted that the number of mistakes kept on&lt;br /&gt;reducing as the years progressed. The earlier one were more related&lt;br /&gt;to incorrect valuations but the mistakes of recent years have been&lt;br /&gt;in estimating the intangibles like brand value, honesty of&lt;br /&gt;management, correctness of financial figures etc.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Aug 5, 2004&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/805&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646321693306133?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646321693306133/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646321693306133' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646321693306133'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646321693306133'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/investing-mistakes.html' title='Investing Mistakes'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646089203562054</id><published>2006-04-30T22:15:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T22:21:32.036-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Intrinsic value Vs. Book Value</title><content type='html'>Valuation of business is key to investing. When&lt;br /&gt;you purchase a stock you are buying a piece of a&lt;br /&gt;business which has certain economic value. But the price of&lt;br /&gt;this piece of business namely market price of stock&lt;br /&gt;,fluctuates around this value due to variation in demand and&lt;br /&gt;supply. To quote Warren Buffet 'Price is what you pay, value&lt;br /&gt;is what you get'. This means that unless you know&lt;br /&gt;about valuation you can never be sure about what you&lt;br /&gt;are getting for your dollar. The most important&lt;br /&gt;concept in valuation of business is the intrinsic&lt;br /&gt;value. In the long term buying stocks below their&lt;br /&gt; intrinsic value is the most successful strategy. In my&lt;br /&gt;effort to demystify equity investing I'm posting&lt;br /&gt;excerpts from a letter of Warren Buffet where he has&lt;br /&gt;explained this all important concept.       Warren E. Buffet on Intrinsic value: Intrinsic value is an&lt;br /&gt;all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to&lt;br /&gt;evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and&lt;br /&gt;businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the&lt;br /&gt;discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a&lt;br /&gt;business during its remaining life.  The calculation of&lt;br /&gt;intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our&lt;br /&gt;definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather&lt;br /&gt;than a precise figure, and it is additionally an&lt;br /&gt;estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or&lt;br /&gt;forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people&lt;br /&gt;looking at the same set of facts, will almost inevitably&lt;br /&gt;come up with at least slightly different intrinsic&lt;br /&gt;value figures. You can gain some insight into the&lt;br /&gt;differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking&lt;br /&gt;at one form of investment, a college education.&lt;br /&gt;Think of the education's cost as its "book value. " If&lt;br /&gt;this cost is to be accurate, it should include the&lt;br /&gt;earnings that were foregone by the student because he&lt;br /&gt;chose college rather than a job.  For this exercise,&lt;br /&gt;we will ignore the important non-economic benefits&lt;br /&gt;of an education and focus strictly on its economic&lt;br /&gt;value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the&lt;br /&gt;graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from&lt;br /&gt;that figure an estimate of what he would have&lt;br /&gt;earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an&lt;br /&gt;excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted,&lt;br /&gt;at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation&lt;br /&gt;day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic&lt;br /&gt;economic value of the education. Some graduates will&lt;br /&gt;find that the book value of their education exceeds&lt;br /&gt;its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid&lt;br /&gt;for the education didn't get his money's worth. In&lt;br /&gt;other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will&lt;br /&gt;far exceed its book value, a result that proves&lt;br /&gt;capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear&lt;br /&gt;is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of&lt;br /&gt;intrinsic value.   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Mar 27, 2001&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/49&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646089203562054?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646089203562054/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646089203562054' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646089203562054'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646089203562054'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/intrinsic-value-vs-book-value.html' title='Intrinsic value Vs. Book Value'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646050416904595</id><published>2006-04-30T22:14:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T22:15:04.170-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Graham's Mr. Market</title><content type='html'>Ben Graham, the guru of value investing , long&lt;br /&gt;ago described the mental attitude toward market&lt;br /&gt;fluctuations that is most conducive to investment success. He&lt;br /&gt;said that you should imagine market quotations as&lt;br /&gt;coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr.&lt;br /&gt;Market who is your partner in a private business.&lt;br /&gt;Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price&lt;br /&gt;at which he will either buy your interest or sell&lt;br /&gt; you his.   Even though the business that the two&lt;br /&gt;of you own may have economic characteristics that&lt;br /&gt;are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything&lt;br /&gt;but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has&lt;br /&gt; incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric&lt;br /&gt;and can see only the favorable factors affecting the&lt;br /&gt;business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell&lt;br /&gt;price because he fears  that you will snap up his&lt;br /&gt;interest and rob him of imminent gains.  At other times&lt;br /&gt;he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble&lt;br /&gt;ahead for both the business and the world. On these&lt;br /&gt;occasions he will name a very low price, since he is&lt;br /&gt;terrified that you will unload your interest on him. &lt;br /&gt;Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He&lt;br /&gt;doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is&lt;br /&gt;uninteresting to you  today, he will be back with a new one&lt;br /&gt;tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under&lt;br /&gt;these conditions, the more manic-depressive his&lt;br /&gt;behavior, the better for you.   But, like Cinderella at&lt;br /&gt;the ball, you must heed one warning or everything&lt;br /&gt;will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there&lt;br /&gt;to serve you, not to guide you. It is his&lt;br /&gt;pocketbook, not  his wisdom, that you will find useful. If&lt;br /&gt;he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood,&lt;br /&gt;you are free to either ignore him or to take&lt;br /&gt;advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall&lt;br /&gt;under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that&lt;br /&gt;you understand and can value your business far better&lt;br /&gt;than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they&lt;br /&gt;say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes&lt;br /&gt;and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the&lt;br /&gt;patsy."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646050416904595?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646050416904595/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646050416904595' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646050416904595'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646050416904595'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/grahams-mr-market.html' title='Graham&apos;s Mr. Market'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646032779298811</id><published>2006-04-30T22:10:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T22:12:07.793-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Book Review: Intelligent Investor</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;This book is a jewel. However you need an eye for it. The book describes a unique approach to investing , surprisingly simple, sound yet unpopular. It also gives you reason why such an approach will not be popular. As for soundness of this approach just go to the appendices and read the article by Warren Buffet "Super-investors of Graham-Doddsville" .He has given an impressive list of people, disciples of Graham, all managing billions of dollars and earning consistent returns as high as 20%-30% for 20 years. The common thread among them is value investment philosophy, described elaborately in the Intelligent Investor. The book demarcates the line between investment and speculation. Graham describes how a stock of a sound company can become speculative at very high price and also, how a stock of relatively unpopular and average performing company can become a solid investment at low price. Graham describes 'Margin of Safety' as basic tenet of investing. With sheer force of knowledge and experience Graham dispels widespread myths (like you need to take high risk for high gains..) about stock valuations and gives a simple, effective approach, which can be used to generate satisfactory returns by an average investor. Graham's wit makes the book interesting despite seriousness of subject. “Buy stocks as you buy your grocery not as you buy perfumes" says he. People may ask how relevant the book is at present time? Well, sound strategies are timeless. If you go by the philosophy of value investing than you can apply this approach with minimum modifications even now 20 years later. If your doubts persist then check October 99 issue of fortune where Warren Buffet , legendary disciple of Graham, warned is clear words about high valuation prevailing at that time. People ignored the warning of 'the fogy old prof', at their own peril. New year chopped of 35% of NASDAQ. The highflying internet stocks lost as much as 90%. Still you may not like it. Value investing is not popular. Warren Buffet says, either you get hooked to it or you don't. There is no middle ground. Still you would benefit by reading this book in innumerable ways .At least you won't call yourself investors as you go on speculating.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Posted : Oct 30, 2000&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/13 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646032779298811?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646032779298811/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646032779298811' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646032779298811'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646032779298811'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/book-review-intelligent-investor.html' title='Book Review: Intelligent Investor'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114646009034683524</id><published>2006-04-30T22:04:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T22:08:10.346-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Of Men and Mania</title><content type='html'>All such inexplicable movements in prices start&lt;br /&gt;due to some fundamental reasons. If the momentum is&lt;br /&gt;sustained for quite some time than that alone becomes&lt;br /&gt;reason for further rise. To explain this I would compare&lt;br /&gt;greed and fear as accelerator and break for the price&lt;br /&gt;movement. When price moves upwards for quite some time the&lt;br /&gt;public starts getting news of people who have made&lt;br /&gt;themselves rich in a short period of time. The lost of&lt;br /&gt;opportunity pinches everybody. If the rally is sustained&lt;br /&gt;further than the fear of losing the chance to be a part&lt;br /&gt;of party overcomes the fear of loss. This is how the&lt;br /&gt;breaks start functioning as accelerator and the prices&lt;br /&gt;rise to astronomical proportions. However in real life&lt;br /&gt;a car without break can not go ahead indefinitely. A&lt;br /&gt;crash is due and it comes as surely as night after&lt;br /&gt;day. After the crash the panic grips the crowd and all of a&lt;br /&gt;sudden negative news start flowing from all sides. A&lt;br /&gt;crash of a fellow driver(read NASDAQ) forces up to&lt;br /&gt;check the speed and grope for breaks. The crash brings&lt;br /&gt;prices not only back to the intrinsic values but often&lt;br /&gt;brings them even lower.       &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The lesson we can learn from these are many.   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1.  If something rises well above its intrinsic price then there is no limit where it will end but that it will end is sure. However you can not go short if you see an stock quoting much&lt;br /&gt;above it's real value. If that price is not high enough,&lt;br /&gt;than even two times that price isn't.   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 2. You can not buy something just after the crash when this&lt;br /&gt;return to their real prices as the momentum generally&lt;br /&gt;takes the prices to opposite extreme. Wait while sense&lt;br /&gt;returns to the sensex.   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. You can not time your entry and exit in such conditions as all forecasts are based on reason and this is by definition rare element&lt;br /&gt;at such times. That means even if you save yourself&lt;br /&gt;from the irrationality of mob, to forecast on the basis&lt;br /&gt;of their rational behavior is foolish.    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4. You can not afford to be overconfident about your&lt;br /&gt;abilities as everybody among the crowd is feeling in the&lt;br /&gt;same way. Like everybody thinks that he will be able to&lt;br /&gt;sell of quickly if a crash comes.    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;5. You can think of your actions as pretty reasonable but even the&lt;br /&gt;reason wears rosy colors in its eyes. All the public and&lt;br /&gt;media is euphoric at such times. The news, forecasts, analysis and even warnings wear same color at such times.   And lastly you can not say that you will plan your&lt;br /&gt;action when such a thing comes but it never tells you of its arrival till such day when you realize that you have brought Wipro at 9500, Zee at 2000 and have no option but to wait and curse your luck.       &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Reference:  Charles Mackay's Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the&lt;br /&gt;Madness of Crowds    John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash, 1929    Charles Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted:  Dec 4, 2000&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/22&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/23&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114646009034683524?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114646009034683524/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114646009034683524' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646009034683524'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114646009034683524'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/of-men-and-mania.html' title='Of Men and Mania'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27351889.post-114645904269973916</id><published>2006-04-30T21:47:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-30T21:50:42.706-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Value investing Vs. Growth investing</title><content type='html'>This article is an attempt to demarcate the line&lt;br /&gt;between two widely used investment philosophies namely&lt;br /&gt;value investing and growth investing. Both these styles&lt;br /&gt;emphasize on getting maximum returns at manageable risk. The&lt;br /&gt;difference ,however is in different perceptions about risk&lt;br /&gt;involved with an investment.     Value investing is buying assets at a cost less than their intrinsic worth. The intrinsic worth is measured as the current&lt;br /&gt;market value of all tangible assets of the company. A more&lt;br /&gt;conservative approach would recommend buying at a cost less&lt;br /&gt;than the net current assets of the company (to get&lt;br /&gt;fixed assets for free..).In reality this also means&lt;br /&gt;that a stock qualifying for value investment will most&lt;br /&gt;certainly be an unpopular stock which has lost its value&lt;br /&gt;due to bleak short term prospects, lack of interest&lt;br /&gt;or general apathy towards company. The value investor&lt;br /&gt;is by definition a contrarian. He buys when everybody&lt;br /&gt;sells.   Growth investing means , putting your money in&lt;br /&gt;the industries with best prospects. Though it sounds&lt;br /&gt;very logical ,it may not be so. When everybody is so&lt;br /&gt;sure about the bright prospects of the future of the&lt;br /&gt;company the demand will push the price to such a high&lt;br /&gt;level that its quite possible that the future growth is&lt;br /&gt;already accounted for in the prices. The growth investor&lt;br /&gt;relies on his timing skills to enter at a price where&lt;br /&gt;there is some scope for profits. This is not so simple&lt;br /&gt;as all are trying to beat each other by buying at&lt;br /&gt;just right moment. The growth investor's domain is high&lt;br /&gt;growth(..thus popular and high priced) stocks.  Apart form the obvious differences there are some subtle&lt;br /&gt;differences in these styles. Whereas the value approach&lt;br /&gt;recommends to minimize risk by buying assets worth the&lt;br /&gt;amount you pay for , the growth investor seeks safety in&lt;br /&gt;the better prospects. The value investor relies in his&lt;br /&gt;valuation skills whereas the growth investor relies on his&lt;br /&gt;timing skills. The growth investor wants to get results&lt;br /&gt;quickly but loses the certainty of profits as a&lt;br /&gt;bargain. The value investor sacrifices the urge to get&lt;br /&gt;quick results for certainty of the results.   What does all this mean to a small investors. Though there&lt;br /&gt;may be differences in opinion, value investing makes&lt;br /&gt;an strong case for small investor. Predicting future&lt;br /&gt;accurately is not everybody's ball game. Even an error of 20%&lt;br /&gt;can make the difference between a profit and&lt;br /&gt;crippling losses. The value investor does not need such an&lt;br /&gt;skill. In Ben Graham's words he just need to be familiar&lt;br /&gt;with high school mathematics. He does not need to take&lt;br /&gt;quick decisions. He does not need to stay in touch with&lt;br /&gt;market movements regularly as long as he has bought&lt;br /&gt;scrips below there value. However, he needs a strict&lt;br /&gt;discipline to avoid pitfalls of human emotions of getting&lt;br /&gt;excessively euphoric of excessively depressed. He needs&lt;br /&gt;patience and will power to go against the general trend.&lt;br /&gt;Simple all these may sound but these qualities need to&lt;br /&gt;be cultivated. Its not hard to understand why value&lt;br /&gt;investing is not a popular style despite its superior&lt;br /&gt;results . Investors are however free to choose their pick&lt;br /&gt;as either of these is better than a haphazard way of&lt;br /&gt;investing(which is the popular approach of most of the investors&lt;br /&gt;unfortunately!).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Posted: Nov 27, 2000&lt;br /&gt;http://in.groups.yahoo.com/group/lawarrenbuffet/message/16&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/27351889-114645904269973916?l=stockvaluer.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/feeds/114645904269973916/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=27351889&amp;postID=114645904269973916' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114645904269973916'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/27351889/posts/default/114645904269973916'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://stockvaluer.blogspot.com/2006/04/value-investing-vs-growth-investing.html' title='Value investing Vs. Growth investing'/><author><name>Kamlesh Pandey</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='25' height='32' src='http://www.askrodin.com/images/tal473_10b.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry></feed>
